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MODUS VIVENDI



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KYOTO, JAPAN
Lauren Yenari, 2022

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

Dear Readers,

On behalf of the entire editorial staff, I am pleased to present to you the 27th edition of *Modus Vivendi*. This title is polyvalent. Originating from the Latin phrase that roughly translates to “way of life,” it also denotes an agreement that brings together conflicting parties to allow them to discuss their differences in peace. That is the hope of this journal: to convene different viewpoints with the purpose of deepening and expanding understanding, both in academia and in practice. We are proud to be one of the few undergraduate journals of international studies to attempt this feat.

To thank for this edition, we have first and foremost the enduring brilliance and hard work of Rhodes College students. The International Studies department and Sigma Iota Rho chapter have nourished their curiosity, challenged their preconceptions, and enhanced their writing skills. Likewise, the professors and advisors within the department deserve recognition and gratitude for their encouragement of critical thinking and meaningful research as well as their generously-offered guidance. In particular, we express our appreciation for Professor Esen Kirdis and her assistance in producing this edition during a uniquely turbulent year. Not to be forgotten, I am indebted to my seven associate editors, who eagerly applied to join the editorial board five months ago and have worked diligently in crafting this publication ever since. Thank you, Olivia Waterton, Hanna Nordin, Priya Tummalapalli, Jaeleigh Johnson, Joon Hwang, Smith Duncan, and Lauren Yenari for your thoughtful and valuable input.

In curating this edition, we especially valued new perspectives and a diversity of topics. From protests in Hong Kong and religious strife in Southeast Asia, to the allocation of terrorist organizations and the Trump administration’s foreign policy, to migration through a feminist lens and an astute case study on the pressing effects of climate change, I hold that we accomplished this goal. For their intriguing and well-researched essays, my congratulations to this year’s published authors: Grace Files, Noor Jaber, Connor Lambert, Eileen Liu, Priya Tummalapalli, and Lauren Yenari. Thanks to their intellect and efforts, this edition offers thought-provoking and informative arguments regarding some of the most gripping issues facing the international community.

Finally, we thank our readers. We hope this edition and the research contained therein challenge and inspire you. Please enjoy.

Sincerely,

Jaclyn Flood

Editor-in-Chief, 2021



POMPEII, ITALY
Sarah Shambaugh, 2022

DELTA BLUES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NEW ORLEANS' AND ROTTERDAM'S RESPONSES TO RISING SEA LEVELS

Connor Lambert, 2022

It is estimated that ⅓ of all cities will be threatened by the crisis of rising sea levels and, by 2025, a majority of people will reside in flood-prone delta cities (Dircke, 2010). Increasingly, deadly floods and storms have overcome the protections constructed to mitigate the impacts of such disasters. On the surface, the cities of Rotterdam and New Orleans appear very similar. Both are thriving metropolitan delta cities. Both are in rich, democratic, Western countries. Both present and celebrate their special connection to the water. Both have implemented multi-billion-dollar projects to stave off the worst impacts of flooding. The question then is how have these two cities taken such a different approach to the same challenge of water management? Peeling a few layers away reveals the answer. The distinct differences that emerge in both their use of institutions and their own citizens' ideas and values of what water is. On an institutional level, New Orleans yields a lot of control of their levee protection to the local administration. This bottom-up level of cooperation has left the most vulnerable communities without a voice in the process which threatens the

Louisiana Delta as a whole.

Comparatively, Rotterdam has a vast infrastructure of local, national, and international communication surrounding flood control (Hudson, 2018). The bureaucratic strength created by these treaties and agreements has unleashed unprecedented levels of cooperation and coordination between these varying actors which has only strengthened Rotterdam's protection. Behind these institutions, there also exists a fundamental difference in how these two cities view their relationship with water. Rotterdam's impressive measures are largely centered around letting water into the city through innovative construction projects. On the other hand, New Orleans has shut water out through its post-Katrina rebuilding. While New Orleans has made major strides from the 1927 flood and Hurricane Katrina, its efforts still fail to fully tackle all the facets of modern flood control. On the other hand, Rotterdam, through its institutions and its wholehearted embrace of new tactics and ideas, has positioned the city as the gold standard for handling delta floods. Understanding how Rotterdam and New Orleans ended up on their paths

requires an exploration of their history with water, an examination of global and national institutions, an analysis of local levee and water boards, and a discussion on how their different values shaped these institutions.

A Historical Review of Regional Floods

To understand New Orleans' and Rotterdam's current approach to water management, their historical relationship with water must first be examined. Both New Orleans and Rotterdam experienced disastrous flooding during the early- and mid-20th century. The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 emphasized the faults in the American policy of water management by purely relying on levee construction. The levees up and down the Mississippi River did well to stem regional flooding but did not anchor deep enough into the ground nor were they high enough to counter against rare but devastating floods (Hudson 2018). In the aftermath of the 1927 flood, an important shift occurred from local control to a more active federal role in flood controls. This was secured in legislation under the passage of the 1928 Mississippi River and Tributaries Project (MR&TP) that included four new strategies like "i) repair and construction of 3200 km of dikes, (ii) river channel 'improvements'... (e.g. channelization),

wing dikes (groynes) for channel alignment, bank stabilization, and dredging, (iii) dam and reservoir construction on upstream tributaries, and (iv) downstream flood crest reduction (Hudson, 2018, p.274). These improvements still have to be implemented with 2021 set as the final date and the mandate of the MR&TP has been revised numerous times. This slow implementation has seen "the original unified vision devolved into a series of incremental segments over a protracted design and construction period" (Jerome 2015). This has created what Hudson (2018) calls "pendulum style" changes to Lower Mississippi flood control (p.275). After the flood of 1927, the pendulum swung towards a larger federal presence in the construction and upkeep of flood controls. Conversely, in the lead up to Katrina, there was a swing back towards local levee boards managing the controls surrounding New Orleans. Hudson (2018) notes that it was this transfer back to local management from the Army Corps of Engineers that led to the failures of the dikes and flood walls (p.276). With these failures of local oversight, Congress again reasserted federal control and poured "\$20 billion dollars into 350 miles of levees, flood walls, gates, and pumps that now encircle greater New Orleans"

(Schwartz, 2018). There are fears that these measures may still not be enough. Another cornerstone of the pre-Katrina mitigation strategy was a focus on pre-catastrophe response, making sure residents had enough to evacuate the city (Wetmore, 2007, p.121). The final subsystem is the post-flood response which focused on getting the city back up to working order (Wetmore, 2007, p.122). The problem with these strategies is that it is hard to run a city that is underwater. It becomes clear that pre-Katrina, New Orleans relied heavily on a system of levees and dikes that were not properly maintained or constructed, with no redundancies in case they failed.

Like the Mississippi Delta, Rotterdam faced similar tragedies during 1917, 1953, and 1990s. The response of Rotterdam and the Netherlands differs from New Orleans as they take an “incremental” approach to their flood management (Hudson, 2018, p.275). Under the incremental model, Rotterdam’s flood control measures have been built up over centuries becoming “more efficient and centralized as the government became more robust” (Hudson, 2018, p.275). The flood of 1953 or the Disaster, as it is known locally, occurred after dikes broke and killed 1,831 people. This resulted in an extensive construction project known

as the Delta Works Project which included “dike fortification, flood basin storage, and massive storm surge barriers” and was completed by 1977 (Hudson, 2018, p.275). This swift implementation of the Delta Works Project stands in stark contrast to the continued roll-out of the MR&TP. In addition to these improvements, the Netherlands constructed the enormous Maeslantkering Barrier. This movable storm surge barrier allows Rotterdam to keep its port open but also forms the capstone of an intricate system that will repel a 10,000-year flood. In comparison, the current system in New Orleans is only thought to be able to withstand a 100-years flood (Schwartz, 2018). These are floods that occur will statistically occur every 10,000 or 100 years. The growing realization among scientists is that these probabilities are becoming higher and higher due to the impact of rising sea levels and more frequent hurricanes and floods (Schwartz, 2018). Yet, it was the floods during the 1990s, in which thousands had to be evacuated, that served as a “wake-up call” to the Dutch government to consider a more comprehensive flood management plan.

Institutions at Work

The most obvious explanation for Rotterdam’s quick and early action on the

Delta Works Project is the strength and centralization of the Dutch government. This is true, especially given Hudson's (2018) incremental model, the Netherlands have been preparing for this moment for a long time (p.275). Additionally, Rotterdam is at the end of "a large watershed that drains eight nations," all of whom benefit from the port there (Hudson, 2018, p.276). This cross-pollination of interests creates a robust system of institutions to govern and protect Rotterdam and its port. At the heart of this bureaucratic system is the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR). The ICPR provides the institutional framework to coordinate "specific thresholds for ecosystem health, floodplain, and river channel conditions, and water quality, as well as protocols for monitoring and information exchange" (Hudson, 2018, p.276). In contrast, New Orleans has no binding international agreement in managing the surrounding watershed. This is understandable as "99% of the Mississippi drainage is within the U.S." (Hudson, 2018, p.277). Yet, the comparison is relevant as the ICPR provides the structure for communication and coordination, whereas there is no overarching comprehensive plan for New Orleans and

its surrounding area. State Representative Jerome Zeringue noted it is hard to get "New Orleans protection to 500 [years] when you have places such as Jean Lafitte, Terrebonne Parish, Houma, New Iberia and other places that have zero level of protection, or at best 10-year protection" (Schwartz, 2018, Challenges Ahead section). Lacking the cooperative plan of Rotterdam, New Orleans and its surrounding parishes are left to compete in a zero-sum game. This basis-by-basis approach and deviation from a defined system design creates a "piecemeal storm surge protection 'system' in name only" (Jerome, 2015).

Regionally, the institutions with the most direct contact with flood management are the levee boards in Louisiana and the water boards in the Netherlands. These boards also demonstrate that ideas shape the institutions rather than the institutions shaping ideas. Functionally, both the levee boards and water boards are given the same mandate of flood control. Yet beyond this broad directive, the differing ideologies shape the functionality of the respective boards in profound ways. The levee boards are not guaranteed certain funding from the state or federal government, instead, they rely on property taxes and leases on local industries (Hudson, 2018). This gap in

funding has left some poorer areas severely underdeveloped thereby weakening the whole system. The problem of funding is also scaled up to the national level as seen in the results of the Decision Chronology Study, a report compiled by the U.S Army Corp of Engineers. The study reveals that the U.S federalist system “produced serious unintended consequences of incremental policy decisions over 20 years” (Jerome, 2015, p.76). The cost-sharing requirements of projects forced local and state partners to look for ways to reduce their own burdens. Oftentimes this “blurred distinctions between technical, policy and fiscal considerations” (Jerome, 2015, p.76).

Looking at flood basin management, Louisiana focuses almost exclusively on drainage while the Dutch have a sophisticated system of maintaining over 100 different water levels across the districts (Hudson, 2018). Communication is often limited between the different levee boards as their jurisdictions are limited to respective parish boundaries. Because of this, important design choices and maintenance decisions were made without “the explicit consideration and open communication of system-wide residual risk, consequences, and reliability” (Jerome, 2015, p.76). In need of

overarching guidance, technical decisions are frequently and significantly “influenced by the local water management objectives”(Jerome 2015, p.76). On the other hand, the Dutch boards extend across political borders conferring to natural boundaries. These issues compound into one study that the constant drainage of levee protected lands coupled with a lack of communication between the boards is resulting in New Orleans actually sinking further below sea level as the sediment is not replenished at a steady rate (Wetmore, 2007).

These differences reflect one of the guiding ideas of Dutch management “to give back to the rivers some of the room we had taken” (Kimmelman, 2017, para.10). Given this ideology, the waterboards work closer with the community having membership be an elected position, compared to governor-appointed like Louisiana. They also reserve the largest share of seats for residents followed by other stakeholders, thus making sure all voices are heard.

The Ideas behind the Institutions

Institutions only tell a small part of the story. To understand why these boards differ so much one needs to peel back a layer to see what kind of ideas are driving these institutions. At the center is a

fundamental difference in New Orleans and Rotterdam's understanding of water. Urban and environmental architect David Waggoner recognized this saying the Dutch "invite water into the city" while in New Orleans "we've hidden and squandered this asset" (O'Neil, 2015, para.2). New Orleans seems to want nothing to do with water inside the city constructing "high walls on top of levees" or have canals run underground (O'Neil, 2015). This mentality of "out of sight, out of mind" has led New Orleans into the unwinnable situation of relying solely on barriers to keep floods at bay. This is to its detriment as New Orleans, unlike Rotterdam, has ample coastal wetlands that help to buffer coastal populations from storm surge events" (Hudson, 2018, p.275). With its concrete first approach, New Orleans is paving over its silver bullet to rein in the rain. This ideology is cemented in the construction of the West Closure Complex, the multi-billion dollar project of levees, walls, and pumps, built in the wake of Katrina. Contrarily, a senior Dutch government advisor commented: "We can't just keep building higher levees, because we will end up living behind 10-meter walls" (Kimmelman, 2017, para.11).

In the Netherlands and especially Rotterdam, flood management has

expanded beyond walls and levees to include a "whole philosophy of spatial planning, crisis management, children's education, online apps, and public spaces" (Kimmelman, 2017, para.11). Instead of using concrete to pave over water, Rotterdam city planners constructed water plazas to function not only as a gathering place for a neighborhood but also to capture floodwater (Kimmelman, 2017). During one of the many long spells of rain or seasonal flooding, the plaza "collects water in one of its three basins" (Karimova, 2017, p.4). The plaza then drains over time and can serve as a "basketball court" or "open space" (Karimova, 2017, p.4). In the same vein, a dike has been converted into a grassy hill, where children play and people shop in the newly built shopping center fortifying the "links between water and neighborhood development" (Kimmelman, 2017, para.37). Beyond just civic projects, Rotterdam has taken to asking citizens to remove concrete paths in their gardens and backyards to expose more soil to absorb rainwater (Kimmelman, 2017).

This is not to say walls and levees do not have a place in modern flood management. Rotterdam is protected by the Maeslantkering gates. Two barriers as long as the Eiffel Tower is tall and 70 feet

high protect the city of Rotterdam from the storm surges of the North Sea. Additionally, the gates are built to withstand even the most extreme climate change models with “sea levels rising beyond current forecasts” (Kimmelman, 2017, para.33). Comparing the Maeslantkering to the West Closure Complex, the issues that differentiate the small levee and water boards manifest in the larger projects. The head of the New Orleans levee board commented that “finding the money to maintain the current system was daunting”. Even now, the cash-strapped state government is struggling to pay its share of the new system which amounts to “\$100 million a year for the next 30 [years]” (Schwartz, 2018, Challenges Ahead section). This lack of funds to achieve the proper protections echoes the similar problems faced by the Louisiana levee boards. There is also a mindset that has developed in New Orleans that New Orleanians are “so focused on killing the snakes right in front of [them] that [they] can’t...think beyond the immediate problem” (Schwartz, 2018, Challenges Ahead section). The West Closure Complex represents the immediate problem by focusing on building up what Katrina destroyed. These values of distancing and protecting from water

have translated into the fortifications encircling New Orleans. What Katrina and Sandy and all other storms and floods have shown though, is that no barrier is impenetrable and no levee is incapable of being breached. Even within the city, this can be seen in the way the New Orleans Sewage and Water Board maintain the drainage systems. “Pipes aren’t checked unless they clog. They aren’t fixed until they fail” in this reaction-based system of maintenance(Baurick, 2020, ‘It’s the way to go’ section). On inspection of New Orleans’ drainage system, Rotterdam’s chief officer of sustainability expressed concern over this mindset saying “if you cannot care for what you have, it is hard to do anything more. You are always fixing old problems” (Baurick, 2020, ‘It’s the way to go’ section). The Dutch place emphasis on the values of accepting and living with water. This is expressed in the various civic projects and neighborhood developments that have invited water into their space in order to save their community.

The Future of Water Management

Some New Orleanians are listening to the lessons of the Dutch. David Waggoner, the architect turned water manager, coordinated a series of “Dutch Dialogues” between New Orleans and Dutch planners

to form a new, comprehensive strategy for New Orleans called the Urban Water Plan (O’Neil, 2015). This plan incorporates several Dutch ideas like opening the canals and the construction of water plazas. In 2013, the project was granted preliminary funding by FEMA, yet full implementation is expected to cost \$6.2 billion (O’Neil, 2015). The plan would be 36 times what the New Orleans Sewage and Water Board spent on projects in 2019 alone. Fast forward to 2020 and the plan is still waiting for funding but has inspired a “smattering of small improvements” (Baurick, 2020, para.12). Officials of the Sewage and Water Board are the first to recognize the immediate need for the measures proposed in the Urban Water plan but cite lack of public support and funding (Baurick, 2020). The Sewage and Water Board are suggesting a stormwater fee to be implemented that could begin to cover the costs of some improvements but again the board “doesn’t have the public support to ask for it” (Baurick, 2020, ‘It’s the way to go’ section).

Rotterdam and New Orleans represent two roads diverged on the path of water management. Their values and the institutions they built to reflect those values offer incredible insight into why the two cities have taken such different

approaches to their shared problem. Starting with their local water boards, Rotterdam placed an emphasis on inviting water into the city with the construction of water plazas in addition to the continued maintenance of traditional barriers like levees. This grew into a new type of neighborhood development that focused on transforming these levees and dikes into places for commerce and gathering. Conversely, New Orleans tackled the problem by adopting the mentality of keeping water distant and hidden behind walls and levees. This is further enforced by the Louisiana levee boards and New Orleans Sewage and Water Board that operate with this same ethos in mind. The almost singular focus on the construction of massive flood gates and pump stations leads to a haphazard approach that hurts New Orleans in the long run. The major differences and points where New Orleans can improve can be found in three instances. Lacking the coordination of larger institutions, from FEMA or the Army Corps of Engineers, has left levee boards without a clear constructive mandate. Second, the lack of funding from local, state, and national institutions is perhaps the most apparent flaw in the fight for New Orleans. \$100 million dollars a year for

the maintenance of a \$20 billion dollar protection is almost impossible for the city or state to fund. The Dutch provide steady and sufficient funding to support the extensive infrastructure of Rotterdam. Lastly, New Orleans must change how it thinks about its relationship with water. The citizens of Rotterdam believe “climate change is beyond ideology” a fact that has yet to resonate with not only normal American citizens but politicians as well (Kimmelman, 2017, para.13). This frame of mind is seen in Rotterdammers’ acceptance of higher taxes to pay for the programs and their strong trust in local government to implement these changes. Rotterdam and New Orleans each face an unprecedented challenge moving forward. With the billions of dollars each city has spent to protect against its surrounding peril, the seemingly common denominator is that safety comes at a cost. The benefits though will be paid back ten-fold. For all the faults that have been given to New Orleans’ West Closure Complex, it is a feat of impressive engineering and its safeguards have saved the city “hundreds of millions of dollars in smaller storms like Hurricane Isaac in 2012” and when larger storms come it will “will pay off multiple times over” (Schwartz, 2018, Challenges

Ahead section). Rotterdam’s emphasis on blending water management with urban development transformed neighborhoods where “drug addicts used to trek all the way from France to buy cheap heroin” to a thriving community centered around the communal water plaza (Kimmelman, 2017, para.39). These differences are important when considering lessons for policymakers and comparative analysis.

When looking through the policy lens, the style of democratic institutions matters all the way from the top of the national government to the small but important local institutions. The decentralized federalist system of the U.S and parish-bound levee boards show significant deficiencies in dealing with the specific crisis of flood management. This same system of cost-sharing between the levels of governments has saddled cities and states with astronomical costs that make them hesitant to spend any more than they have to. After viewing both cities’ approaches it is clear that a more centralized institution with clear mandates and accountability is better suited to handling the risks like floods that do not respect political boundaries. This is where the Dutch system of integrated and empowered institutions

shine. From a clear directive from the national government, along with guaranteed funding, the local institutions are best prepared to not only manage flooding but turn it into an opportunity of growth.

Rotterdam and New Orleans represent fascinating looks into how values influence institutions. Rotterdam's acceptance of climate change and trust in large local and national government reflect in their well-oiled, bureaucratic programs. Additionally, this relationship allows both citizens and politicians to grapple with expensive projects and large societal changes to grapple with the implications of climate change. In New Orleans, the memory of Katrina still pains many citizens and its more recent impact still influences many actions and policies the citizens and city have taken. Even 15 years later neighborhoods are still trying to establish themselves. As the Executive Director of the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority noted, "that portion of the Lower Ninth Ward that didn't come back, and hasn't come back, that's the reality of where we are. We are rebuilding a neighborhood" (Simerman, 2020, Chicken vs. egg section). This experience could be the reason for their belief in shutting water out of their once flooded city by covering their canals and

paying billions of dollars in new concrete walls to encircle New Orleans. The guiding mentality seems to be if the city is able to correct the mistakes of Katrina, because it was so disastrous, they will be safe from any other storm that comes their way. Varying beliefs about the impact of climate change also fuel the inability towards forming a cohesive, long term plan in changing how New Orleanians live with water. In both Rotterdam and New Orleans, values can be seen shaping the institutions, but also the institutions reinforcing those values on its citizens. Dealing with catastrophes require large scale collective action with an even larger price tag; this is a hard truth to face for any type of government let alone people. Despite the differences explored between these two cities, a common, unshaken resilience to stand up against these calamities is shared in understanding how they need to move forward.

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
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CUENCA, ECUADOR
Elyse Jacobs, 2021

VIOLATED BORDERS AND VIOLATED BODIES: AN EXAMINATION OF STATE SECURITY AND GENDERED VIOLENCE AGAINST MIGRANT WOMEN

Grace Files, 2021

When Cindy, a Latina migrant woman, was eighteen, she attempted to cross the border from Mexico into the United States. A smuggler brought her to a stash house in Mexico, where she was instructed to wait for her border crossing. While she was waiting in the stash house, the smuggler raped both Cindy and another woman at gunpoint. Shortly after the attack, Cindy found out that she was pregnant (Fernandez, 2019).

Stories like Cindy's are all too common. During their attempts to cross the border into the United States, sexual violence is the rule rather than the exception for migrant women from Latin America. Sexual assault and rape are so common that many Latina women are instructed to expect it during their journeys (Téllez et. al, 2018). Informational flyers and well-meaning friends or family members advise women to invest in birth control so that they don't become pregnant from assault, as Cindy did (Téllez et. al, 2018). Women's underwear is hung on tree branches by men who assaulted them to show others that a rape took place. These "rape trees" are a phenomenon across the Arizona desert where many migrants attempt to cross into the United States

(Téllez et. al, 2018).

While many U.S. politicians condemn the sexual violence against Latina migrant women, little has been done to examine the structural forces that lead to that violence. The systemic nature of the issue indicates that the current immigration system does little to stop the violence—as, if it did, the violence would cease or diminish—yet many politicians continue to call for the same solutions: increased militarization of the border and efforts to stem the migrant flow from Latin America. These policies are based in traditional, patriarchal conceptions of state security, and they do nothing to stop the violence against migrant women. Instead, policies based in traditional conceptions of state security actually contribute to gendered violence. Unless policymakers confront the flawed assumptions underlying their conceptions of state security, there will be no end to violence against Latina migrant women.

Many academics and policymakers ground their conceptions of state security in the idea that the state is a pre-discursive entity that exists naturally in the realm of politics (Weber, 1998).

They assume that the state has a stable identity with goals and interests that are exogenous to any outside interaction (Wendt, 1994). Feminist conceptions of state security challenge these assumptions. Rather than pre-discursive subjects, states are actually subjects in process; they are the ontological effects of practices that are performatively enacted (Weber, 1998). All hallmarks of state identity—borders, governments, policy—are socially constructed by people; because they are socially constructed, they are always subject to change. State identity is therefore constantly in flux as the institutions that comprise the state vary over time (Weber, 1998). The only way to reify and secure state identity is to continuously perform that identity, and any lapse in performance jeopardizes the stability of the state as it brings to light the social construction of an entity previously thought to be natural. Ostensibly naturally occurring, state identity is in reality performatively constituted (Weber, 1998).

This is not to say that there is no materiality to the state, but rather that state materiality means nothing in a vacuum. Without performative expression, there can be no understanding of state materiality and

identity. Without these understandings, the state has no relevant meaning (Weber, 1998). Thus, to form state identity the state must be defined as a social object in opposition to others, where state identity is constituted through social interactions with those others (Wendt, 1994). Social identities and interests are therefore always in process and continuously influenced by those interactions (Wendt, 1994). Furthermore, the construction of state identity through opposition to other actors means that the categories of “insider” and “outsider” are mutually constitutive, and that without an other/outsider to reify state identity, the state cannot exist (Doty, 1999). However, hierarchy is built into this constitution, where the “insider” is considered superior and more worthy of protection than the “outsider.” Due to this hierarchy, mere perception of membership in the “in group” is enough to generate in-group favoritism (Wendt, 1994). That favoritism plays out in the international political realm through state emphasis on protecting its own citizens above outsider non-citizens. This dynamic is clearly expressed through border control rhetoric that emphasizes protecting “us” (the insider citizens) from “them” (the outsider migrants).

In this context, traditional conceptions of

state security do little to protect any pre-existing, physical state. Instead, efforts to secure the state are really meant to secure state identity through two means. First, state identity must be continuously reproduced to uphold the status quo and ensure stability. Second, the socially constructed nature of state identity must not be acknowledged, and the state must instead be portrayed as a free-standing entity. Through these means, the security of state identity is ensured. However, it is important to understand that within this framework, traditional conceptions of state security are inherently gendered. The state is conceptualized as a feminized, passive entity—a physical space that cannot protect itself. She therefore requires masculinized, militarized protection from a physical, outside threat. This masculine protection allows the feminine state to reproduce herself through male citizens, who can continue to protect the feminine state so that she can continue to produce masculine protection, and so on. The cyclical nature of traditional, masculine conceptions of state security works to continuously reproduce traditional conceptions of the state itself. It is only when that cycle is broken or interrupted that the foundations of state identity can be called into question.

Immigration is therefore extremely troubling to state identity, as it calls into question foundational assumptions about the unified “inside” state and anarchic “outside” as outsiders cross inside the state (Doty, 1999). Migration interrupts the traditional cycle of state security by forcing confrontation of the social construction of borders that the state uses to reify its identity, because immigration raises questions about who counts as “the population” (Doty, 1999). States are dependent on the construction of a unified population to reify identity, but if existence within physical borders is not sufficient to include migrants in that unified population, how can such a population be constructed? Thus, immigrants challenge state identity by conflating the dichotomized categories of “insider” and “outsider” and, in doing so, reveal the social construction of performative categories that the state insists are natural. Greater international integration across borders, then, results in greater national dis-integration as the sovereign identity of the state is deconstructed (Waldinger, 2018).

The threat that immigration poses to the state, then, is not any concrete, physical danger, but rather existential in nature; immigration threatens the state’s ability to continue to performatively constitute

its identity. Immigration policies, therefore, do not work to protect the physical state and its citizens, but are instead a constitutive element of the state system (Waldinger, 2018). Heyer (2018) emphasizes this point when she writes, “Representations of the outsider as a social menace have been reinvented in moments of national crisis, with the general pattern evidencing xenophobia’s productive function in the national imaginary” (p.153). This productive function allows citizens to continue to feel as if they share and value a common identity—the identity of Americans, constructed in opposition to immigrants. Within this framework, Latina migrant women pose a specifically gendered threat to state security. Public discourse overwhelmingly portrays Latina sexuality as dangerous, out of control, and pathological (Chavez, 2013). Leo R. Chavez summarizes the situation when he states, “During the most recent, post-1965 wave of immigration, Latina reproduction and fertility, especially of Mexican immigrant women, have been ground zero in a war of not only words but public policies and laws” (p.74). This is because, as Chavez explains, Latin fertility and immigration are “key components of population growth and other demographic changes” (p.74). The

demographic changes that Latina migrants initiate, however, are problematic when it comes to upholding the United States’ standards for who counts as an insider and who counts as an outsider. The children of Latina migrant women blur the boundaries between immigrant and citizens—boundaries which are crucial to constructions of state identity (Chavez, 2013). Thus, under traditional conceptions of state security, Latina migrant women pose a direct threat to the United States, particularly by way of their sexuality.

It is not a coincidence, then, that these migrant women experience widespread sexual violence that is directly linked to their transgressions across state borders. Sexual violence occurs both during their journeys to cross the border—often by the men upon whom the women are reliant to cross into the United States—and within the U.S. Many times, sexual violence within the United States is perpetrated by border patrol agents and customs officers (Chavez, 2013). In one processing center, guards forced a woman to strip and then proceeded to grope her (Téllez et. al, 2018). At an immigration detention center, officers sprayed mace on a woman, sexually assaulted her, and then filmed her as she showered away the mace (Téllez et. al, 2018). Another girl was

kidnapped and raped by a border patrol officer when she was only fourteen (Fernandez, 2019). Many more stories like these go unheard, as the vast majority of migrant women do not report their assaults and have no legal recourse for the violence committed against them (Fernandez, 2019).

While it might be easy to write off individual stories of sexual violence as isolated occurrences caused by a few bad men, to do so is to ignore the broader structural forces that contribute to this deeply personal violence. Sexual violence never occurs in a vacuum. In the case of Latin migrant women, it occurs as part of the larger struggle over border security—and, by extension, state security. The patriarchal, cyclical nature of traditional conceptions of state security require masculine protection so that the state can fulfill a feminine, reproductive role by reproducing the performative institutions that secure state identity. Thus, masculine actors are tasked with controlling feminine reproduction in the name of state security. Latina migrant women, whose reproductive capacities threaten the cohesion of state identity, become another physical site that requires masculine domination and control in the name of security.

When a man commits an act of sexual violence against a woman, he asserts control over her reproductive capacities and punishes her for her sexuality. This holds true when a male U.S. citizen—such as an immigration enforcement officer or a border patrol guard—sexually assaults a Latina migrant woman. By forcibly taking control of her reproductive capacities and punishing her for her sexuality, he is not only establishing his dominance as patriarchal oppressor; he is also determining his dominance as masculine actor who defines state identity and, therefore, controls state security. He takes away the power of the Latina migrant woman to expose the constructed nature of state identity and punishes her for possessing that power in the first place.

While sexual violence against migrant women during their border crossings may not be committed by U.S. citizen men, it still has the same effect. Latina migrant women are punished for their fertility and sexuality, and any power they might have in their reproductive potential is stolen by men. Even though assault is temporary, the trauma remains with the women for the rest of their lives, impeding the empowerment they might have otherwise found in their bodies and sexualities (Fernandez, 2019). While many politicians point fingers at the

non-U.S.-citizen men who commit the assaults, the role of U.S. immigration policy cannot be ignored in this aspect of sexual violence. Current U.S. immigration policy actively works to make the border crossing journey more dangerous for migrants by militarizing the border and funneling migrants through harsh deserts where many do not survive the journey (Téllez et. al, 2018). Additionally, many migrants must rely on smugglers if they want to stand a chance at crossing the border. This allows the United States to prevent migrants from entering the country without taking responsibility for the inhumane conditions utilized to inhibit migration. Thus, U.S. immigration policy creates a structural situation in which Latina migrant women are almost always reliant on male smugglers to cross the border, forcing women into positions where they must submit to men. The dangerous conditions of border crossings compound Latina migrant women's vulnerability, making them even more susceptible to sexual assault from the men on whom they must depend. While the role that U.S. immigration policy plays in creating Latina migrant vulnerability goes unacknowledged, it still works to punish the threat of Latina sexuality through militarized action, as traditional

conceptions of state security require.

Of course, traditional conceptions of state security are not the singular driving factor that cause sexual violence against migrant women. However, it is necessary to examine the intersection between traditional, patriarchal conceptions of state security and sexual violence at the border. Policymakers typically consider state security in gendered terms as a conquest that must be achieved through physical dominance over perceived threats; the fact that threats are perceived not because they harm citizens, but because they expose the social construction of the state itself, remains unacknowledged. As long as this is the case, sexual violence against Latina migrant women at the border cannot be eliminated. Policymakers must begin to change the discourse surrounding state security if they intend to start taking this issue seriously; they should work to demilitarize the border and change the patriarchal rhetoric surrounding state security instead of forcing migrant women into situations where they are susceptible to violence. This could take the form of reducing gun usage at the border, creating a more streamlined route to citizenship, and expanding on efforts to accommodate migrants with shelters in place of prisons or detention centers.

Rather than focus on security as a matter of nations, policymakers should shift focus to emphasize the security of individuals—regardless of where those individuals were born.

While this paper has focused primarily on migration across the southern border of the United States, the reproduction of the state as a constructed entity is a project every nation undertakes. Future study that turns outward from the United States to examine immigration policy and rhetoric in other nations may benefit from an understanding of how such rhetoric often becomes intertwined with conceptions of state security. Specific case studies examining migration to Spain or the U.K. might find the theories explored in this paper useful as a tool for explanation. Likewise, future study should address how patriarchal rhetoric plays out in instances where migrants are not construed as “outsiders,” and, thus, threats to state security, to the same degree as those migrants crossing the southern border of the United States. For example: what form does patriarchal rhetoric take, if any, for migrants moving across the United States’ northern border? Admittedly, this paper is limited to a theoretical examination; therefore, future research involving a narrower focus on empirics may help develop more nuance

within the theory and may help present policymakers with more concrete data to support the policy prescriptions listed above. While the social construction of the state is a universal truth for every nation, the forms in which this social construction interacts with patriarchy will likely vary across borders. However, for the United States, at least, the value of recognizing the social construction of the state is in recognizing its ability to be flexible and to change in ways that benefit all persons living within its socially defined borders—but until politicians begin to think this way, little can change.

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BERLIN, GERMANY
Mary Beth Baker, 2021

RELIGIOUS TENSIONS IN MYANMAR: POLITICAL, HISTORICAL, AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Eileen Liu, 2021

Introduction

While many tend to associate Islamophobia with the Western world and white nationalism, Islamophobia is a global crisis that has been contributing to one of the largest refugee crises in the world – the Rohingya Crisis.

Buddhist-Muslim conflicts have resulted in high rates of displacement of Rohingya people fleeing from the Rakhine State in Myanmar due to the atrocities committed against them by the Buddhist majority state. Awareness of this crisis shocks many people, since popular sentiment of Buddhism is often positive as people tend to see this religious group as pacifists.

This paper seeks to uncover the sectarian radicalization that led to Buddhist violence against Muslims, alongside exploring the historical, political, and social implications of violence. Why are there prevailing tensions between the two groups and what caused these tensions to escalate into a full-blown genocide? By using the theories of Ethno-religious Nationalism and Institutionalism to help us analyze the situation in Myanmar, we can extrapolate the following: religious tensions were encouraged and utilized by government authorities to bond the Burmese through their shared religion of

Buddhism, causing an increase in religiosity and the authority of religious institutions.

Brief Historical Background

To better understand the marginalization of the Rohingya people and the escalation of tension between the two religious and ethnic groups, it is important to look at the historical context. Myanmar, previously named Burma until it was changed by the military junta in 1989, was under the colonial rule of Great Britain from 1824 until 1948. Great Britain's dominance in the global sphere during the age of imperialism included their control of India at the time. As their imperialist tendencies extended eastward, Indians - whether Hindu or Muslim - moved to towns and cities across Burma. Current day India and Bangladesh border the northwest of Myanmar, while China, Laos, and Thailand border Eastern Myanmar. Most Muslims settled in the northern Rakhine State, located on the west coast of Myanmar directly bordering Bangladesh, and these Muslims identify themselves as Rohingya. They are descendants of Arab or Muslim traders whose family lines have established roots within the land for generations.

After Myanmar gained independence from Great Britain in 1948, the new state officially recognized 135 ethnic groups and categorized them into eight indigenous “races.” However, “the Myanmar government and the overwhelming population of Myanmar call [the Rohingya] illegal Bengali migrants from neighboring Bangladesh...[thus] Rohingya is not included among the 135 ethnic groups in Myanmar recognized by the government” (Kipgen, 2013, p.300). The Rohingya were once allowed to apply for identity cards, offered rights, and many even served in Parliament, but these policies changed when the military coup seized governmental power in 1962. The Burmese government enacted policies that forced the Rohingya to lose their citizenship status and be considered illegal immigrants. Having familial ties to the Rakhine state spanning generations, dating further back than the British colonization of Burma, the Rohingya assert that they have a claim to the land and a right to be recognized by the Myanmar state. Today, Myanmar has a quasi-civilian system of democratic government, also known as a hybrid democracy.

Although Rohingya Muslims represented the largest Muslim population in

Myanmar, the violence and atrocities committed against them caused the population to dwindle. Through systemic religious and racial discrimination, they were denied citizenship, preventing them from obtaining any rights and governmental welfare assistance. There always existed Muslim-Buddhist conflict. In fact, the strife between Myanmar Buddhists and Muslims dates back to WWII when their ideological differences caused them to support opposing sides; the Rohingya sided with the British colonialists while the Buddhists supported the Japanese invaders. For example, “due to human rights violations, an estimated 200,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh from 1978 onward. A new wave of an estimated 250,000 Rohingya fled to the country in 1991” (Parnini, 2013, p.281). Thus, the conflict between Muslims and Buddhists in Myanmar is not something new.

However, the last exodus presented an internationally alarming conflict. This began on August 25th, 2017 when state troops began their “clearance operation,” backed by local Buddhist mobs, in which they burned Rohingya villages and indiscriminately killed civilians (Reuters Staff, 2020). This has become the world’s fastest growing refugee crisis according to the United Nations. While there were

around one million Rohingya living in Myanmar in early 2017, many were murdered, died of starvation, or were forced to flee due to the state-sponsored ethnic cleansing acts, such as the burning of homes and crops, the blockages of access to food supplies, use of rape, and open gunfire. The number of Rohingya still living in the Rakhine state dropped to around 400,000 in December 2017. The Rohingya have formed their own militia, ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army), constituted of Rohingya volunteers and men pressured to take up arms to fight back against the state government. There continues to be Buddhist-Muslim violence in the Rakhine state, and many refugees are still seeking a safe place to stay in the neighboring countries such as Bangladesh and Indonesia.

Myanmar Through Theoretical Frameworks

Ethno-Religious Nationalism

The sectarian violence is in part caused by the importance of ethnic and religious identity in Myanmar because of the strong ties between Buddhist and Burmese identities. Post-colonial Myanmar saw a struggle with leadership and national identity after gaining independence from Britain in 1949. Thus, the governing leaders used the majority Buddhist religious identity to connect its

people, creating ethno-religious nationalism, which encourages discrimination and sectarian conflicts. Ethno-religious nationalism is based on race, ethnicity, and shared values, which are easily manipulated by the state but tend to be more discriminatory and violent. In this case, we can see direct ties between Myanmar citizenship, religion, and ethnicity. This differs from civic nationalism, which is based on equal rights and secular citizenship, where people within a nation are connected through their shared rights, creating a more diverse and peaceful society. However, using beliefs and values to connect groups of people tends to be easier than through man-made laws and doctrines. In this example, being a citizen of the Myanmar state is often tied to being Buddhist and ethnically Burmese. While there is no official state religion and there is a diverse number of religions practiced, the population overwhelmingly consists of Buddhists. This majority has the power to influence media and public thought, social relations, and political policy in their favor.

Even before the independence, Burmese nationalists wanted to assert their dominance, and in 1930, anti-Muslim and anti-Hindu riots killed hundreds. In 1962, after the military junta takeover, the

ethnically Burmese citizens passed policies that restricted and limited the rights of the Rohingya. They restricted citizenship to only those whose descendants lived there before 1823, thereby disenfranchising the several thousands of immigrants who remained. The Muslims living in the Rakhine State were also limited in their ability to leave because of local and travel regulations. By not recognizing the Rohingya, the Burmese government implicates that they are illegal immigrants with no legal and civil rights in the society. By portraying the Rohingya as aliens and barring them from citizenship, it further reinforces the sentiment that they are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Their lack of citizenship prevents them from having the same rights as other Myanmar people and from having any power in government and politics.

In addition, the Burmese government attempts to separate Rohingya from Myanmar as a whole. The state wishes to exclude the minority group from the state by stripping their Rohingya identity away from them. Instead, they simply refer to them as “Bengali” to further enforce the belief that they are immigrants with no rightful claim to citizenship. Similar to French secularism or *laïcité*, there are minority/majority

conflicts that lead to the debate as to what it means to be “French” or “Burmese.” By making the national identity dependent upon shared values and ethnicity rather than simply based on shared rights and citizenship, there is a greater chance for marginalization of minority groups and “othering” of those who do not fit the mold the state creates. By consistently pushing Muslims out and differentiating them from the rest of the population, they are essentially grouping all ethnically Burmese people together while excluding the Rohingya and doing so implicates that the Rohingya do not belong. The ethnically Burmese also claim the Rohingya are ‘incompatible’ with “[their] traditions, [so] what constitutes a putatively authentic Burmese citizen or tradition is put into question, even potentially undermined” (Prasse-Freeman, 2013, p.3). By arguing that the Rohingya are not a part of Burma because of their different traditions, the Burmese are using their ethno-religious nationalism to segregate and alienate the Rohingya population because of their differences in cultures and traditions.

Institutionalism

Institutionalism focuses on the role of institutions in shaping the goals that actors can pursue, thereby shaping the actions in which they can partake. This

theory posits that a path-dependency can be created by institutions. Thus, this theory emphasizes the importance and influence of institutions over individual choice and action – a structural approach to international relations. By using this theory to explain the Rohingya crisis, we see that the authority of religious and political institutions has always played a large role in their society. Religious leaders, monks, and politicians use their power to mobilize the masses, frame and influence public perception, and can ultimately either incite violence or advocate for peace between different religious groups.

The origin for the tensions can be traced back to the military junta that took over in 1962 where the dictatorship promoted fierce nationalism based on the country's majority Buddhist identity, and singled out the Rohingya as a common enemy to unite the population. The military junta used religious differences to their advantage by focusing on the bonding of Buddhist citizens and the isolation of the Rohingya group. The Myanmar government, with its use of technology and social media, is able to transform social perspectives towards Muslims and use fear to scapegoat and blame this minority group. Myanmar consists of many different ethnic groups, but the

dominance of ethnic Burmese allows for a “high level of nationalism defined along ethnic lines [that] tends to justify an extreme standpoint, [enabling] leaders to create scapegoats out of minorities and reduce the scope to manage intergroup tensions” (Burke, 2016, p. 260). In a polarized environment as such, there is little space to promote their shared values or common goals. Rather, the ethnic majority choose to marginalize the Rohingya to prevent opposition.

Many Buddhist monks in the country also incite violence towards this group simply due to their difference in faith. Buddhist nationalism always had deep roots in Myanmar political history but has become more prominent in recent years. Buddhism has seen a decline in its relevance and an increase in fears that the rise of Islam is a direct attack on their religion. The “lifting of military junta controls on free expression and assembly led to populist mobilization of hard-core and deeply felt grievances about Buddhism being under siege from the forces of modernity, globalism, and Islam” (Callahan, 2018, p.251). As the political atmosphere allows more opportunities for Buddhists to spread their religion, the Buddhist Burmese are able to spread more anti-Muslim sentiments to other ethnic Burmese

citizens. The Buddhist monks use technology to fill hate speech narratives that go viral on social media and contribute to a rise of anti-Muslim violence across the country. They blame Muslims for the lack of economic prosperity, claiming they ruin the state and do not deserve welfare because of the stereotype that they have large families and overrun the country. Two of the most prominent monks in Myanmar that incite this violence are U Wirathu and Sitagu Sayadaw. They argue for the religious justifications for alienating and murdering of the Rohingya. They defend their actions by saying that they are simply defending Buddhism from Muslim attacks. While Buddhism is the majority religion and the Rohingya are those who suffer and die from Buddhist attacks, the monks argue instead that Buddhism is under attack and declining. U Wirathu has preached during his teachings of the dharma, “These days, whatever you do, you need to do it from a nationalist perspective.... Our existence as a Burmese Buddhist nation has been threatened” (Walton, 2016, p.796). Hence, the followers have perceived the teachings as a need to protect their country from Muslims who are violent, immoral, and commit acts of crime such as rape and murder. While he does not

cite specific scriptures, “the power of U Wirathu’s words and their resonance among his listeners are enhanced by a set of factors that often go unexamined in studies of the interaction of religion and politics” (Walton, 2016, p.797). Meanwhile, Sitagu Sayadaw, during his sermons, would “suggest that the killing of those who are not Buddhist could be justified on the grounds that they were not complete humans, or indeed humans at all” (Fuller, 2017, para.1). These nationalistic Buddhist monks have used de-humanization and “othering” techniques on the Rohingya Muslims to defend their incitement of violence towards the Rohingya.

Because the government is a hybrid democracy, where the former military junta now has a large role and impact in the government, the newly created governmental institution provides the former military junta leaders many benefits and influence. This structure limits the effectiveness and integrity of the democratic processes of the ostensibly democratically elected government. Since the transition from a military state to a democracy, the military has retained mass amounts of power which consequently hinders the ability of the Myanmar leader Suu Kyi, the first democratically elected leader and Nobel

Prize winner, to give in to international pressures and help the Rohingya. She legally has no power to direct the military or broader security forces to act against the country's supreme military commanders since the military has retained its absolute authority over Myanmar's defenses, internal security, and border control. Many contribute Suu Kyi's surprising silence on the Rohingya to the fact that "the position of Myanmar's democratic opposition is ambiguous at best and at worst a mirror of the military's current and historic position" (Lee, 2014, p.326). Hence, Suu Kyi's silent complicity on this issue may not be a sign of her agreement, but rather, a sign that she has her hands tied, since the military has denied many powers the head of the government requested.

Because of the power struggle between the democratic government and military forces, the government has become less representative of their people and accountable for its actions. The government disenfranchises the ethnic minority as a whole and refuses to be transparent and accountable for its actions. In addition, the mere fact that the military impacts the government illustrates the democratic government's lack of autonomy. The international

environment has also contributed to the grounds for the genocide through the lack of international pressures. Islamophobia - prevalent in other countries and used in the rhetoric of other world leaders - influences Myanmar's own framing of the Rohingya crisis. In addition, the international community is not likely to reinstate sanctions on Myanmar, having only recently lifted them and realizing the economic effects of such. For example, the United States, despite our strong stance against human rights abuses at the international level, "now has little appetite for sanctions, given the evolving economic and strategic high stakes in the country and the region," and "Myanmar's neighbors China and India are vying for access for their ambitious and competing connectivity projects, which include roads and pipelines" (Fair, 2019, p.153). These economies as institutions have allowed for these acts of ethnic cleansing, although not accepted, to be overlooked for the economic and political self-interests of states.

Conclusion

Much of the anti-Rohingya sentiment stem from the view that they present a threat to Burmese national security and the prevailing national myth that Buddhism is at risk of being overrun by

Muslims. The Rakhine State consists of mostly Buddhists (around 60%) despite the large Muslim population, and this number has increased substantially due to the massive emigration of Muslims fleeing violence. Because of the many ethnic Burmese in the Rakhine state, the concept of equal rights and plural government that may help accommodate diverse groups is seen to undermine the Rakhine cause. Instead, there is an increase of ethnic-Burmese individuals in the Rakhine state, with the goal of transforming the area into a Buddhist-dominated state, allowing for anti-Muslim sentiment to continue to spread.

This paper focused on exploring theoretical explanations for the sectarian violence through both institutional and identity-based lenses. The nationalistic identities of both the ethnic Burmese and the Rohingya led to divergence in values, cultures, and religions. British and Japanese imperialism substantially attributed to the long-standing strife, as the two groups struggle to consolidate power, leadership, and national identity after gaining independence. While there is a long-standing conflict between the two groups, the violence escalated to a point of international concern. By looking at the historical, economic, and

political tensions between the two groups, we can better understand what led to the genocide in Myanmar. The political institutions, headed by the ethnic Burmese majority, also encourage the acts of ethnic cleansing, presenting an obstacle for the democratically-elected leadership to intervene.

Just as international influences from the British and Japanese contributed to the history of tensions between the Rohingya and Burmese, the effects of contemporary globalization and international soft power have also left an impact on Myanmar. Future research into this topic can explore the impacts of globalization on the economic insecurity in Myanmar, and how this may impact the radicalization of Buddhist monks.

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THE HIGHLANDS, SCOTLAND

Elyse Jacobs, 2021

POWER, POLITICS, AND PROSPERITY: DONALD TRUMP'S FOREIGN POLICY
THROUGH A STRUCTURAL REALIST LENS
Priya Tummalapalli, 2022

Despite a bitter election season and losing the popular vote, a real-estate mogul emerged victorious and ascended to the world's highest position of leadership in January 2017. How President Donald Trump ran the country from then onward has been interpreted in innumerable ways, but chaotic, unruly, and un-American make up the majority opinion. Some of his harshest critics include his presidential predecessors, often ashamed of President Trump's domestic policy and even more disturbed by how he has chosen to govern the United States at the international level (Blackwill, 2020).

This essay seeks to explain President Trump's seemingly turbulent foreign policy through a structural realist lens. Specifically, it will assume that the president may not have been the ill-fit leader we perceive, but rather, uncomfortably realist in a liberal world. This essay will explore how the president used his prior expertise as a hard-ball negotiator in a business setting to drive his foreign policy success. That is, how did he alter world politics, and with what purpose? This piece will then close with a poststructuralist counterargument

highlighting the devastation President Trump's foreign policy created over time. Ultimately, while political criticism and skepticism accompanied the president throughout his term, he unapologetically proceeded with a structuralist approach, deteriorating world order for the sake of American interest.

**Structural Realism: Rebranding
American Foreign Policy**

Structural realism maintains three central truths: 1. states exist in an anarchic system; there is no higher authority to bail them out in dire situations; 2. states assume all neighboring states have malign intentions; 3. power is the currency of the international system. Given these truths, states operate in an infinite quest to out-power and outperform each other. Doing so ensures a state's survival in an environment that seeks to consume it. Dunne (2016) breaks structural realists into two groups: defensive realists and offensive realists. Defensive realists accept the structural realist truth of power but contest its maximization. They warn this approach is deadly, as the international structure naturally balances against major powers, only allowing brief

periods of hegemony. Offensive realists take an opposing view; they advocate for states to pursue hegemony as a durability strategy. Offensive realists promote power-grabs and self-serving policy as a means to an end: survival (Dunne, 2016, pp.52-55).

From day one, President Trump took his position at the helm as a firm offensive realist. Power acquisition and protection were the hallmarks of his administration. Understanding the central elements of structural realism allows us to put Donald Trump's disordered foreign policy into context. His brash personality made him unfavorable among the majority, ultimately leading to his failure to win re-election. However, upon review, we find that President Trump's un-favorable conduct was relatively successful at the international level. Despite President Trump's failure to glean public approval, he has earned a decent evaluation by foreign policy committees for his attempt to secure the United States' hegemony in the West. Therefore, structural realism explains that President Trump acted the way he did to attain U.S. power with the ultimate purpose being survival. But: why did President Trump abandon the liberal approach norm and opt for self-interest? For him, it was on brand.

The Transactional Man Makes America Great

G. Richard Shell, an award-winning scholar and author at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, published a review essay that compares Donald J. Trump to the well-known negotiation strategy model dubbed The Transactional Man (T.M.). Shell (2019) argues that the president's administrative approach resembles many of the T.M.'s hard-ball qualities; Trump's ability to transcend ethical norms without conscience anchored him to be a ruthless realist at the international level. The Transactional Man sets high goals, targets others' motivations to gain leverage, manipulate perceptions, and anchor the bargaining range at his end (Shell, 2019, p.32), With precision, President Trump behaved in sync with the T.M. model: making tall claims, discrediting the press, gaslighting his advisors, and refusing to enter negotiation rooms that did not serve him. Trump relished in this power strategy; his brand thrived on the T.M. model, so he embraced all it offered, using "... bold strokes, dramatic flair, and robber-baron-infused romance to promote himself as the ultimate Transactional Man" (Shell, 2019, p.33). This brand - which we recognize under

the moniker "Make America Great Again"- would launch Trump into his presidency and guide his hand throughout his term. Plainly, MAGA is structural realism in action and, ultimately, how U.S. foreign policy became self-serving, business-oriented, and focused on passing the buck in some of the world's most pressing issues (Dunne, 2016).

The Eagle and Dragon Compete: Foreign Policy Success

Without denying the unethical nature of his approach nor how ill-equipped he was in critical situations, a fair assessment of the Trump administration's foreign policy requires consideration of his victories as much as his defeats. In doing so, we must acknowledge his style and determine its efficacy in rendering success. Employing what we know of offensive structural realists, Donald Trump was more successful than his opponents would like to admit. For example, according to the Council of Foreign Relations (2019), Donald Trump's foreign policy was a success from a strictly independent, nonpartisan viewpoint. In its foreword, the authors acknowledge the rampant political un-enthusiasm but ultimately subdue those charges to grade Trump objectively.

Specifically, "Blackwill argues that even though many of President Trump's actions have been impetuous and the president oversees a chaotic and often dysfunctional policymaking process, some of his foreign policies are better than his critics give him credit for" (Council, 2019, p.iv).

The Council cites three personal successes of President Trump:

- heightening power-competition with major world powers
- rolling back the physical caliphate in the Middle East
- cracking down on China's rising economy and its intellectual theft

These so-called successes, the first of which liberals would portray as an outright failure, are consistent with the structural realist theory. Structural realists stress the state's vulnerability, only mitigated through power accumulation and projection (Dunne, 2017). The United States is unfamiliar with intimidation; as a unipolar power, the international structure long protected and served the United States' interests. However, with China's rise to the West, the Middle East's turmoil in the East, and alienated allies at all sides, President Trump took a curiously paranoid stance, accepting only relationships that heightened power and

dismissing those that might lessen it. With no "night-watchman" to protect America's security, the president believes he will best protect and secure American interest through power maximization. Thus, the hallmarks of offensive structural realism - buck-passing, security competition, and self-indulgence - situate comfortably beneath the president's hand.

Closing in on the Council's third point, this essay will elaborate on how the president reimagined America's relationship with China as an especially illustrative example of the Transactional Man and offensive structural realism shaking hands across the table and as the key to explaining how un-chaotic the president's foreign policy approach was. Under Trump, the ultimate "neighbor paranoia" complex played out on the international stage. Auxiliary paranoia cases include heightened anti-immigration policies targeting Mexican and Latinx refugees and withdrawal from the North American Free Trade Agreement. As for the main issue at hand, Robbie Gramer, a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy, breaks down Trump's strike on China. For four years, the Trump administration redirected the U.S. national security apparatus away from

decades of focus on the Middle East toward an era of heightened focus on Beijing as the greatest existential threat to the United States in coming decades. Trump's first strategy to take down America's growing neighbor was to discredit China at home. Just as the Transactional Man feeds misperception, Donald Trump took on domestic media outlets, then fed his supporters a gloomy narrative of Chinese perils. Some were true; some were fear-mongering. The most compelling threat was his administration's warning of intellectual theft: "They successfully recruit a fair number of laypeople, academics, professors or students who might not start out necessarily working for the Chinese government, but are eventually recruited and encouraged and incentivized to become a conduit," Paul Chan, the managing principal at the Bird Marella law firm declared (Farivar, 2020, para.17). The following response by the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property alleged intellectual property theft costs the U.S. economy hundreds of billions of dollars each year, and China is "the world's principal IP infringer" (Farivar, 2020, para.15). President Trump choked out China's A.I. fraud with a firm grip. The Council of

Foreign Relations specifies, "On February 11th, 2019, President Trump signed the American A.I. Initiative executive order, to promote sustained investment in A.I. [artificial intelligence] R&D in collaboration with industry, academia, international partners and allies, and other non-Federal entities,' to 'reduce barriers to the use of A.I. technologies to promote their innovative application,' and to train the next generation of American A.I. researchers and users through apprenticeships; skills programs; and education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics" (Blackwill, 2020, p.11). This evidence, coupled with the residual distrust of the Communist regime stemming from the Red Scare in the early 1900s, led the president's supporters to believe his claims of national vulnerability. Fear on the part of the president's polarized electorate gathered the domestic support needed to support a structural realist approach.

Similarly, structural realists like Ken Waltz argue that the international system's structure pushes states to act aggressively and engage in security competition. The root causes of this paranoia are the architecture of world politics. Donald Trump escalated the domestic paranoia of a rising China to

the international level and took on the very architecture that threatens to shift and re-balance power. China is what structural realists refer to as a revisionist state; it wants to move and ascend the world order hierarchy. There is a contentious debate among International Relations scholars as to whether China is content with its current position of power or seeks to revise the standing world order (Dunne, 2017). In this case, the president chooses to interpret China as a revisionist state. Seeking to maintain unipolarity, President Trump rejects China's desire to ascend the international structure hierarchy and balances the United States against Chinese interests. The Trump administration dropped out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); citing China's profiteering from the TPP as a threat: "China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda" (*USITO*, 2019, para.2). Additionally, the Trump administration occupied contested territory in the Pacific. By moving navy fleets into the South China Sea, the United States checks the blue water influence China has built in the heavily trafficked Pacific trade route (Blackwill,

2020). Military power projection is fundamental to the president's resistance to China's rise in the West. Structural realists view power acquisition as a sustainable practice: any traction will outlast the costs.

Aside from military power projection, the president imposed tariffs and strengthened proxy relations. Working through the Indo-Pacific "Quad" group, the Trump administration coordinated regional policy with India, Japan, and Australia. Strengthening relationships with surrounding countries ensures there will be allies who balance against the rising superpower. However, these proxy alliances alienate the president from current allies and undermine the Free World image. Notably, the United States' relationship with Prime Minister Modi and President Putin- both known nationalists, authoritarian leaders- signaled the start of abnormal alliances and confused our European allies. Far more concerning is the relationship between President Trump and President Putin following the rumored Russian collusion in the United States 2016 presidential election. Nevertheless, proxy relations were necessary for a successful structuralist approach. As for the tariffs imposed, President Trump worried economists with his hard-nosed

approach. Unfazed by China's enraged response, President Trump pushed tariffs with little concern for international or domestic consequences. The fuel that powered his decisions was not equity or sustainability; neither of those are T.M. or structural realists' qualities. He intended to send a message, to broadcast and project his brand: America First.

A Poststructuralist Critique: Breaking World Order

Despite the success of the president's foreign policy, he has fallen short in approval. Domestic approval ratings are low. Abroad, the Council of Foreign Relations reported that under his leadership, "...the United States is more unpopular with publics in many democratic countries than it has been at any time since such polling began in 2001" (Blackwill, 2020, p.3).

Poststructuralism explains where this discontent comes from and the danger his structural realist approach-successful only within a small range- poses to the world order. This essay opened to explain the Trump administration's policy decisions. For a thorough analysis, objective, nonpartisan conclusions are imperative. However, in this section, we will explore criticisms: why despite his minor success, the president will never

escape the scathing review by esteemed officials, presidential predecessors, international allies, and citizens at home. The same criticism shared by the majority constructs the framework of what we know as poststructuralist theory. Poststructuralism speaks about world politics from a "vantage point." This point is built high by the individual's physical, incorporeal, ideological, and historical narrative. The relationship between knowledge and power is most significant in world affairs. We must consider the oft-ignored state identity (its vantage point) to interpret and predict behavior in the international system (Dunne, 2016, p.197). The United States rests atop a white, Western male-dominated position. Thus, U.S. identity is best positioned to manipulate the international structure to favor, promote, and influence international social relations. To this end, poststructuralism offers an ethos rather than an explanatory framework. It asks for the state and its policymakers to consider position and privilege in the hierarchical world order. Poststructuralists aim to help us incorporate equity in global affairs: recognize one's place, act accordingly. Previous international paradigms aggressively ignored questions of self-reflection, hegemonic responsibility,

and rampant inequity. Poststructuralism seeks to fix that.

Poststructuralism asserts that nothing lies beyond the bounds of discourse; perspective and identity allow states to build relationships over difference, contrary to the imperial narrative. Namely, President Trump ignored the poststructuralist setting and prioritized his representation over others', leading to significant political consequences at home and abroad. This critique strikes the president for his inconsiderate approach to American foreign policy. The structural realist and T.M. models do not favor equity; both advocate for zero-sum plays, power accumulation, and exclusion. To this end, states are encouraged to operate as selfish, rational actors with no consideration for the periphery or even the totality of all international system participants. As Donald Trump employs this self-serving approach, we witness global destruction in the long run.

As Dunne (2016) states, the poststructural critique is "inescapably ethical" as it is concerned with change and development (p.206). Donald Trump chose to regress the work achieved by his predecessors and international allies in progress towards this change. Regression came with the president's refusal to engage in

discourse. Instead of clear communication and seeking negotiation, Trump chose to rely on material aggression and surprise retractions from multilateral agreements, casting aside traditional, diplomatic communication methods. If he approved of a state's work, he cut them an economic deal and shook the leader's hand on television. If he disapproves, they are blasted with sanctions and given a scathing public review. Thus, poststructuralism proves to be President Trump's worst critic: shaming him for his choice to prioritize self-interest, destroy relationships of difference, and refuse to lead campaigns of intervention against traditional, exclusionary practices.

Poststructuralists value perspective and representation as critical considerations and, thus, unavoidable when engaging in international discourse (Dunne, 2016 p.216). Each international actor is complex with state history, a common people, and self-interests that all have significance. The president chose to discard significance with the structural realist approach; his greatest failure was the deliberate choice to step up and govern in a nuanced, inequitable manner. He failed to consider the United States' architecture, place, vantage point, and significance. But more importantly, he

failed to consider the positions of his allies and opponents. Without this insight, the United States' foreign policy success is short-lived and likely detrimental to global development in the long run. The President of the Council of Foreign Relations may have cited President Trump's structuralist foreign policy decisions as successful, for which, indeed they are; but what should be jointly considered is the consequence of his foreign policy decisions on world order and development. In which case, the president falls gravely short of any success.

Conclusion

This essay trudged through rampant disapproval to make sense of President Trump's seemingly irate, disordered foreign policy and determine its efficacy for the U.S. administration and citizens. Structural realism - more specifically, offensive realism - explains and legitimizes the president's aggressive, self-interested policy approach. The Council on Foreign Relations concluded the president evaluates decently: meeting the criteria to be deemed successful in his approach to China and other international matters. However, the Poststructuralist ethos uncovers the numerous pitfalls and destructive nature

of the president's decision to freely exercise self-interest at an extreme violation of international order. Failing to consider discourse, experience, and strength from one's vantage point only acts as a battering ram against change and progress. In a position of global power leadership, Trump's decisions were wholly irresponsible and unethical. Perhaps, as the sun sets on Donald Trump's term, the incoming President-elect, Joseph Biden, will reconstitute the United States as a beacon of development and understanding. A return to the American oath of steady leadership may amend damaged alliances and restore dignity to our name. Until then, America must move forward with an understanding of the former president's erroneous policy decisions. Poststructuralists wisely advise American foreign policy to extend beyond our own prosperity and work in tandem with the international structure to ensure the global wellness.

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"RESTORE HONG KONG, REVOLUTION OF OUR TIMES!" A LOOK INTO
THE CAUSES OF THE 2019-2020 HONG KONG PROTESTS
Lauren Yenari, 2022

Introduction

Since its designation as a semi-autonomous region of China, Hong Kong has seen several bouts of protest movements from its citizens. Though the specific reason for the movements vary, these protests continuously tie back to the discrepancy of interpretation of the "One Country, Two Systems" agreement between pro-Beijing and pro-democracy citizens in Hong Kong. Most recently, the protests in Hong Kong have taken the international stage as social media and the modernization of news allowed the world to watch pro-democracy Hong Kong citizens flood the streets for their beliefs. The internationalization of the most recent Hong Kong protests begs the question: why did, or what actions taken by the Chinese government directly lead to, the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests occur and how did they grow? Pro-democracy Hong Kong citizens have claimed that these protests were wholly brought on by the introduction of the Fugitive Offenders Amendment Bill in the Hong Kong legislature (Albert, 2019), but this paper will show there are many factors that have led to and continued the protests. Furthermore, it will analyze

several reasons for the 2019-2020 protests including historical precedent, modernization of mass mobilization within Hong Kong due to mass media, and increased censorship within Hong Kong.

Although the Fugitive Offenders Amendment Bill's, referred to from now on as FOAB, introduction into the legislature was the spark that kicked off the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests, it is an amalgamation of factors that led to its continuance and internationalization even through police brutality and the threat of COVID-19. Hong Kong's police, official or otherwise, met protesters with brute force which resulted in the evolution of the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests into being about something more than just the FOAB. The backlash peaceful protesters received from the government and the police force led to dissenters reflecting on larger grievances with the government (Wong, 2020). While the protests started due to the FOAB, they grew exponentially due to previous altercations with Beijing and the Hong Kong legislature in the past and the modernization of mass media.

Historical Precedent

Previous clashes between the Chinese Communist Party, pro-Beijing Hong Kong legislators, and pro-democracy Hong Kong legislators have significantly contributed to the emergence of the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests. They caused resentment between pro-Beijing and pro-democracy Hong Kong legislators, ultimately coming to a head within these protests. A majority of these clashes are brought on by the difference in interpretation of the “One Country Two Systems” policy by the different groups. “One Country Two Systems” is a principle that was first established by Deng Xiaoping which explains how Hong Kong would be governed as a special administrative region under China. Although Hong Kong became a part of the People’s Republic of China, China would not implement any socialist or communist measures in Hong Kong for at least 50 years under this principle. This principle is in place between Hong Kong and China until the year 2047 (Grossman, 2020). Therefore, Hong Kong has been allowed to continue its capitalist economic system and way of life.

“One Country, Two Systems” was the agreement between China and Hong Kong to end Hong Kong’s time as a British colony. Hong Kong was placed

under British colonialism following the First and Second Opium Wars. It was not until 1997 due to the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 that Hong Kong remained as a British territory. British colonialism had a significant impact on Hong Kong’s economic development, and its relationship with China as a whole. As a British colony, Hong Kong was exposed to a fully Western and modernized economic system, which was extremely different from the communist model that China followed. As such, Hong Kong was a capitalist system under Great Britain which is why “One Country, Two Systems” has the condition within it for Hong Kong to remain as such up until 2047 (Joseph, 2019).

Looking at this from a post-colonialist lens, Britain’s colonialist period over Hong Kong had implications that contributed to the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests. Due to previous Western colonialism and altercations with the West, the Chinese Communist Party is inherently distrusting of Western influences which includes the idea of capitalism. By proxy, the Chinese Communist Party is extremely watchful over Hong Kong and its economic and political happenings resulting in frustrations of lack of autonomy from pro-democracy Hong Kongers (Yung,

2017).

The CCP and pro-Beijing lawmakers emphasize the “one country” aspect of One Country Two Systems. This has resulted in Xi Jinping and the current CCP actively trying to take more control within Hong Kong which pro-democracy legislators view as an infringement of the One Country Two Systems principle. The pro-democracy legislators are more so focused on the “two systems” within One Country Two Systems and wish for the CCP to allow Hong Kong and its citizens to operate freely. This, however, has not been the case as the CCP has consistently interfered in Hong Kong law and politics due to the power they hold over the region, as the CCP holds the authority to interpret Hong Kong’s Basic law however they see fit (*Basic Law*,1997). Some of these interferences include disqualification of lawmakers to be elected and the control they hold over Hong Kong’s Chief Executive. The CCP’s interference in Hong Kong law and politics has consistently infuriated pro-democracy Hong Kong citizens and legislators, resulting in dissent and protests within the region.

A major historical precedent that contributed to the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests was the disqualification of pro-democracy lawmakers by Hong Kong

courts in 2017. These legislators were disqualified from office because the courts found their oaths to be disrespectful to China during the official swearing-in ceremony that took place in October of 2016. All Hong Kong lawmakers are required to take an oath and swear allegiance to Hong Kong as a part of China; however, the High Court ruled that certain pro-democracy lawmakers amended the oaths to say different things or “read it in a tone of voice that was derogatory to China” (Jung, 2017, p.1). The disqualification of these lawmakers was a distinct political move by the CCP and pro-Beijing lawmakers in Hong Kong to diminish the majority pro-democracy political parties had gained in parliament through the elections. The removal of the legislators from office allowed for the pro-Beijing coalition to once again take control of parliament, and as such maintain veto power.

This decision by Hong Kong’s High Court caused massive backlash within Hong Kong, which has left a bitter rift between pro-democracy and pro-Beijing citizens even up until now. The day the decision was handed down by the High Court, there were dozens of people outside. Both pro-democracy citizens in protest and pro-Beijing citizens standing for the

decision of the Court had come to make their opinions known (Wong, 2020). The disqualification of the legislators set off a chain reaction of other pro-democracy lawmakers stepping down from their seats in parliament in solidarity with those who were elected to serve, then deemed ineligible.

The result of historical precedent set by both the difference in interpretation of “One Country Two Systems” and the interference of the CCP into Hong Kong policy and law is resentment from pro-democracy Hong Kong citizens and legislators towards the Chinese Communist party. This resentment has transformed most modernly into open dissent and criticism of the Chinese government and its interference in Hong Kong. Prior to the 2020 National Security Law being implemented in Hong Kong by the Chinese government, pro-democracy citizens hung slogans, posters, and signs denouncing the CCP and pro-Beijing legislators for their infringement on the “One Country Two Systems” principle. Internationally, protests have been viewed as a way for dissenters to openly express their frustrations with the government in an effective way, so it is obvious as to why the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests grew to such a massive height given the tensions growing

between pro-democracy citizens and Beijing since the CCP first started to exhibit more forcible control over Hong Kong.

The Fugitive Offenders Amendment Bill

In reviewing the literature, a majority of researchers believe that the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests stemmed from anger surrounding the introduction of the Fugitive Offenders Amendment Bill to Hong Kong’s parliament. The FOAB was an amendment to Hong Kong’s previous extradition policies that would “establish an extradition mechanism that would operate on a case-by-case basis with states not covered under existing extradition treaties, including mainland China, Macau, and Taiwan” (Albert, 2019, p.1). Rather than maintain the extradition policy that was in place, which requires the entire legislative body to approve of an extradition, it places the responsibility of that choice onto the Chief Executive of Hong Kong.

This was viewed as an attempt by the Chinese government and pro-Beijing lawmakers to grant more political power to China within Hong Kong, as who is allowed to be Chief Executive of Hong Kong is restricted by the CCP. On the official government website of Hong Kong, it states that “he or she is elected by a broadly representative Election

Committee in accordance with the Basic Law and is appointed by the Central People's Government (Government Structure, 2020)." This "broadly representative" election committee was created in 2014 by China's Standing Committee. All candidates who are interested in running for Chief Executive are required to be pre-approved by the Election Committee (Economist, 2017). This ensures that no member of the pro-democracy parties is considered eligible for the role of Chief Executive, as they would clash with the opinions of Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party is not interested in introducing further freedoms to the region of Hong Kong, given they are already significantly freer than China proper in a multitude of ways. By ensuring that only pro-Beijing lawmakers are eligible to become Chief Executive, the Chinese Communist Party maintains a strong ally within Hong Kong to keep the status quo as it is.

Allowing the Chief Executive to solely handle extradition concerns caused a massive uproar both in the Hong Kong parliament and the region as a whole. What emphasized the majority's unhappiness with FOAB were the groups that stood in solidarity with the Hong Kong public against it. The international business community saw this bill as a

major deterrence from conducting business in Hong Kong, as many of the laws covered in FOAB had to do with economic charges such as bankruptcy and tax evasion. The international backlash the bill faced forced the legislators who introduced it to drop nine of the economic-based charges that were originally in the bill (Albert, 2019, p. 1). FOAB threatened the deterioration of Hong Kong's political freedoms and that did not bode well with the general public. Due to the implications this bill contained and a number of other previous clashes between pro-democracy Hong Kongers and pro-Beijing law-makers, citizens took to the streets condemning the bill and the encroachment of the CCP on Hong Kong's freedoms.

Social Media's Role in the Internationalization of the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests

Though there have been many instances of protests or political movements that have taken place in Hong Kong, even prior to the United Kingdom transferring the territory to China, the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests are one of the most visible and trending movements seen to date. This is due to the modernization of mass media, including the constantly growing popularity of social media. People all around the world were able to

watch these pro-democracy protests and the violence occurring as a result of them on every platform, almost 24 hours of the day at some points in 2019. Ever since the 2016 Presidential Election in the United States, social media has evolved into a major new source for citizens of the world (Allcott, 2017, p.1) and was integral in the internationalization of the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests.

Thanks to the “One Country, Two Systems” principle, Hong Kong is not within China’s massive firewall that restricts Chinese citizens from gaining access to Western social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram without a VPN. Therefore, Hong Kong protesters were able to upload content and create headlines that would normally not be seen when mass media was restricted to television news channels and newspapers. The biggest posts that shed light to the divisive nature of these protests were Hong Kongers posting videos of un-uniformed police or pro-Beijing groups attacking and rioting against these protesters. A specific one of those posts was on Twitter, where a video of a group of men beating other passengers in a crowded subway station to create chaos trended worldwide (Lee, 2019). Those men were also videoed by social media users as meeting with and

shaking hands with the Hong Kong police outside after this event. A professor from Singapore Management University, Tracy Loh, stated that both protesters and the Hong Kong government used social media during the protests as “a tool to battle for public opinion (Shao, 2019).”

By highlighting protesters or police forces committing acts of violence, pro-democracy and pro-Beijing Hong Kongers were trying to garner international attention and sway the public’s view of the protests. This worked undoubtedly in favor of the protesters, as the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests became a worldwide trend on Twitter for months on end (Leow, 2019). Social media users in democratic nations such as the United States, the EU, and more voiced their support for and solidarity with the Hong Kong protesters in millions of social media posts. Because of how much these protests were trending online, traditional news sources such as television networks dedicated a large amount of airtime to the protests at their peak (Leow, 2019).

The 2019-2020 protests have been lauded as a “leaderless movement,” with different groups of dissenters coming together in order to express their discontent with how China is encroaching upon Hong Kong’s autonomy. Instead, social media

was used as the main source of mass mobilization. Protesters were able to use social media to create both an online and offline presence, as social media allows for anonymous ways to disseminate information including where and when to meet. The way social media was able to mobilize Hong Kong's masses against the government is reminiscent of Mao's emphasis on mass mobilization. Mao Zedong found it integral in his communist ideologies to use mass mobilization of the people in order to instill change such as class struggle, communes, and more (Joseph, 2019). Now, that idea is being used by thousands of protesters in Hong Kong to stand up to China's newest strongman regime of Xi Jinping and the CCP.

Censorship in Hong Kong: The 2020 National Security Law & What Happened after the 2019-2020 protests

Protests in Hong Kong still rage on, but the mass rioting and violence that took place in 2019-2020 resulted in various responses from the Hong Kong government and the CCP. One of the most major negative responses that was a result of the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests was the CCP's implementation of the 2020 National Security Law in Hong Kong. The 2020 National Security Law harshly punishes dissidents, putting into

law that any Hong Kong citizen suspected of crimes broadcasted internationally has since died down most likely due to COVID-19. The protests saw of subversion, terrorism, separatism, or collusion with foreign forces can be sentenced with up to life in prison (Shibani, 2020). This law was created by the CCP and President Xi Jinping, not the Hong Kong legislature itself. The CCP views this law as a by-the-books legal procedure, and something that has needed to be implemented in Hong Kong for a long time. Pro-democracy Hong Kongers think differently, as China's ability to implement a law in Hong Kong while the Hong Kong legislature is supposed to be separated from China is unsettling to them (Shibani, 2020).

This sets back the Hong Kong protesters' demands for China to respect the "One Country Two Systems" principle, as the law has resulted in Hong Kong citizens losing a considerable amount of political autonomy and free speech to the CCP. Several political parties in Hong Kong have disbanded and their leaders tried. A major example of this is the political party Demosisto, whose leaders Joshua Wong, Agnes Chow, and Ivan Lam were sentenced on December 2nd to prison time due to their participation in the party (Ramzy, 2020). Agnes Chow was

also the founder of Hong Kong's largest pro-democracy newspaper *Apple Daily* along with Jimmy Lai. Lai and two other senior managers of the newspaper were charged with fraud following the implementation of this new law (Ramzy, 2020). As this National Security Law also expands police powers to seize electronic equipment and "intercept communications and covertly surveil people reasonably suspected of crimes against national security," there has also been a mass deletion of Hong Kongers' social media accounts in order to protect themselves from persecution (Wong, 2020).

Overall, the implementation of this law by the Hong Kong government and the CCP increases the censorship seen in Hong Kong by tenfold. Hong Kong has always been outside of the majority of China's censorship policies, but it is obvious that with the shift to strongman politics under Xi Jinping that is changing. Though they are not completely shrouded by China's firewall, this new National Security Law creates a pseudo-firewall by threatening Hong Kong citizens with imprisonment if they choose to publicly dissent against the CCP and Hong Kong government.

Conclusion

The 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests have

been a defining moment of this generation due to their internationalization. The protests have yet to end, but results have already been seen from the height of them. Carrie Lam, the previous Chief Executive of Hong Kong, is being pressured to step down following criticism of her support for the FOAB and her bland response to COVID-19 (Kuo, 2019). The FOAB was shot down, but the protests continued to rage on. If the FOAB was the sole purpose for the protests, that would have been able to quell the dissent we continue to see on the news. However, it is obvious that there were other reasons for the protests to continue and grow to such an international level. The historical precedents set by previous protests in Hong Kong and the difference in opinion about "One Country Two Systems" has led to a continued rift between pro-democracy Hong Kong citizens and the Hong Kong legislature, which helped to continue to fuel the fire of protesters even after some of their demands were met. Furthermore, the modernization of mass media and popularity of social media pushed the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests onto the international stage, allowing the world to truly understand what was going on in Hong Kong and protesters to feel the support they were

getting from the rest of the world.

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CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

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THE POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS BEHIND ASCRIBING "TERRORIST" ORGANIZATIONS

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Today, Middle Eastern political affairs are often synonymous with terrorism. While many western powers influence which organizations are designated as "terrorist," the regional governments of the Middle East also have their hand in distributing this label. More often than not, the label of "terrorist" is used to dissuade people from sympathizing and identifying with dangerous, irrational groups that threaten the safety and security of a society. While this labeling reduces tension within states with high rates of terrorism, many governments have an ulterior motive when ascribing the "terrorist" label to political organizations. Some states declare domestic, relatively non-violent and religious groups as terrorists, while other states integrate internationally identified terrorist organizations into their political affairs. The inconsistencies within the determinants of a "terrorist organization" begs the question of, why do some Middle Eastern states label non-violent organizations as "terrorist"? Throughout the remainder of this paper, I will analyze various governments in the Middle East to explore this question. I will argue that groups that pose an internal and external challenge to the

regime are designated as "terrorists" by their regimes to cut down their mass base of international support, regardless of their strategic use of violence.

The Political Significance of Ascribing "Terrorism"

One way to eliminate political opposition is through assigning rhetoric with a negative connotation to the targeted organization. This process, labeling, is achieved through "[identifying] an object, [removing] it from the unknown, and then [assigning] to it a set of characteristics, motives, values and behaviors" (Bhatia, 2005, p.8). In doing this, the new label's connotation, such as "terrorist," is attributed to the subject in question. Thus it "becomes known in a manner which may permit certain forms of inquiry and engagement, while forbidding or excluding others" (Bhatia, 2005, p.8). Thus, the way society interacts with the subject changes according to the connotation of the label. A specific label used by states to characterize and repress particular organizations is *terrorism* to "justify systematic repression...and further toughen measures against human rights defenders, political opponents and

political prisoners” (Amnesty, 2002, p.246). However, because of the lack of clarity surrounding the limits of the label, terrorist, and negative connotation, popular political opposition groups to regimes have become a target to the infamous label: “the term terrorism is the current vogue for discrediting one’s opponents... and portrays them as a people who cannot be reasoned with” (Kapitan, 2002, p.179). Essentially, regimes that perceive opposition groups as a threat can taint the organization’s reputation and perception based a single label, regardless of their use of violence. Thus, while the *terrorist* label is politically beneficial for states, the connotation associated with terrorism is debilitating to the organization’s ability to generate popular support within the public. This will be explored by examining the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the regimes’ decision to designate them as terrorist organizations.

Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

Terrorism is synonymous with the use of violence to achieve political goals. One organization that found roots itself within the use of political violence is the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK

emerged in response to the repression of the Kurdish identity by the Turkish government to force “the assimilation of the Kurdish-speaking population under the rubric of the Turkish nation” (Tezcür, 2010, p.778). The PKK’s armed insurgency began in 1984 and while it has moderated over the years, a varying degree of violence persists to this day. Officially, the PKK asserts that it, “no longer advocates separation from Turkey as official policy but seeks the transformation of—and its integration into—a democratized, confederalized Turkey” (Casier, 2010, p.395).

Despite the PKK’s moderation to gain influence and representation within the Turkish state, the Turkish government prevents the PKK from any sort political mobilization through their designation of the organization as being terrorist. The Turkish government defends their repressive policies against the Kurds by expressing that “there is no Kurdish problem in Turkey which needs a political solution, but Turkey has a terror problem which needs a military solution” (Al, 2015, p.687). Since the creation of the PKK, efforts of Kurdish nationalism threaten the Turkish identity. To prevent the nationalization efforts of the Kurds, the Turkish government has strategically labeled the PKK a terrorist organization

to hinder their ability to politically mobilize: “The PKK is officially ostracized from involvement in any internal process anyway by the Turkish state terrorist designation” (Casier, 2010, p.403). By attaching the label of terrorism to the agenda of the PKK, the Turkish government is able to effectively prevent any measure to promote or sympathize with Kurdish nationalism. The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) within Turkish politics only further complicated the popularity of the PKK among the Kurdish minority as they continually “challenge the PKK's claim of being the real representative of the Kurds of Turkey” (Tezcür, 2010, p.783). In addition to suppressing the Kurdish voice in society, the AKP seeks to appeal to moderate Kurds by asserting that AKP is a superior alternative for Kurdish social well-being to the terrorist PKK. Therefore, to prevent the rise of sentiments of Kurdish nationalism, the Turkish government has prevented the PKK from achieving political legitimacy by ascribing them as a terrorist organization.

Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood is perhaps the most widely known manifestation of having a self-interested state label them

as *terrorist* in order to prevent political opposition. Since its inception in 1928, the Brotherhood has been labeled as being a terrorist organization by multiple Egyptian regimes despite the Brotherhood's rejection of all forms of violent and repressive methods to achieve their goals. During the Arab Spring, the Muslim Brotherhood became very popular among Egyptians which led to them being the first democratically elected political organization in Egypt. Because of the popular support the Brotherhood generated among the masses during the Arab Spring and the power vacuum that resulted after Mubarak stepped down, Egypt's new government engaged in heavy crackdowns against the Brotherhood. Several prominent leaders of the Brotherhood were imprisoned and charged with leading an illegal organization that sought to undermine Egypt's political and legal institutions. Overnight, the Muslim Brotherhood went from an organization that many Egyptians openly supported and sought out for social stability, to becoming a social liability to the safety of its supporters if caught being associated with the Brotherhood. Thus, the regime's assertions that the Brotherhood's policies infringe upon the values of the Egyptian

state “only legalizes repressive policies against the organization but also enables mass mobilization behind repression” (Darwich, 2017, p.1290). In fact, by characterizing the popularly-perceived Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, many began to ascribe radical attributes to the Brotherhood, from fear that they too would be associated with terrorism and be repressed.

Consequentially, the labeling of the Brotherhood as *terrorist* not only increased the risk of mobilizing as Islamist organizations, but it served as a deterrent to their popularity and growth. The adoption of repressive domestic policies by states, in this case Egypt, is done according to the self-interests of the established regime to ensure the longevity of their influence over the populace. With regard to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, since it posed as an internal threat to the stability of the state’s legitimacy, the regime took action to repress its political opponents in order to maintain power.

The Political Significance of Embracing Recognized “Terrorist” Organizations

Although exiling opposition groups may be an effective way to counter political opposition, some nations have opted to

integrate largely-recognized terrorist organizations into the political system. In a region where instability is inevitable, many Middle Eastern regimes have decided that in order to maintain their power, a degree of cooperation is more favorable than repression: “cooptation and containment are more effective and sustainable than crackdown” (Freer, 2017, p.495). Rather than risking the stability of their regime, by creating a relationship between these opposition organizations, states are able to secure their positions of power while making it appear as though they are conceding a portion of their power to these organizations.

It is not that these states advocate the use of violence or encourage political opposition, rather, the relationship between these organizations and the state becomes mutually beneficial: “the reality is more complex and involves circumstance as much as active choice” (Roberts, 2014, p.91). On the one hand, this transactional relationship of mutual benefit becomes important for political opposition and violent organizations as their legitimacy relies upon an agreement of coexistence between the state and these organizations. On the other hand, the stability of the established regimes also relies upon these organizations’ compliance to respect and concede

authority to these governments. This connection will be explored by examining the Muslim Brotherhood cases in Qatar and Hezbollah in Lebanon and the respective regimes' decisions to integrate these organizations into the political systems.

Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood

Although the Muslim Brotherhood has become an ostracized organization by many governments due to the political appeal they have garnered among civilians, the relations between the Brotherhood and state within the context of Qatar is unique. The history of the Brotherhood in Qatar begins with the refugees and exiles of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that resulted from a crackdown by the Arab nationalist regime of Nasser. Unlike the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Qatari Brotherhood was forced to adapt its ideology to “exist primarily as ideological inspiration rather than as organized parties” (Freer, 2017, p.480). As a rentier state, Qatar is the sole provider of social services to its populace and, since it derives much of their revenue from oil, comfortably able to do so. An implication of this is that since the government is solely responsible for the state's well-being and does not require aid from the populace, political mobilization

is relatively impossible. Therefore, organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood “seek to gain positions and influence through the state, for they know they will be unable to effectively challenge it and ultimately cannot survive without it” (Freer, 2017, p.494).

However, the relationship between the Brotherhood and Qatar is not so much relational as it is transactional and involves circumstance. Prior to the arrival of the Brotherhood refugees, the Qatari government needed educated employees to maintain a high quality of living for its populace: “The core motivation for the importing of Brotherhood members into Qatar was the basic need for educated employees to undertake a range of roles, from teaching Islamic studies...to establishing and managing emerging bureaucracies” (Roberts, 2014, p.88). Therefore, the Qatari government took advantage of the influx of educated refugees and placed them in high-ranking positions in society. While placing the Brotherhood within these positions would pose a threat to nations with less stable regimes, as a rentier state, Qatar was “confident that its own security will not be undermined” (Roberts, 2014, p.92). An additional factor that incentivized Qatar's involvement with the Brotherhood related to hegemony of

Saudi Arabia within the Gulf region: “if Qatar was to have a chance to escape the diplomatic orbit of Saudi Arabia or the Gulf region, it would need links outside the region, a reason for Arabs in the wider region to consider and interact with Qatar as a country by itself” (Roberts, 2014, p.92). The Brotherhood is one of the few organizations with human capital in nearly every country throughout the Middle East. Additionally, given recent hostile Qatar and Saudi relations, partly stemming from their differing perspectives of the Brotherhood, strengthening Qatar’s ties to the Brotherhood allows for them to form social ties with other nations in the Middle East and develop an identity independent of the Gulf. Therefore, the transactional relationship between the Qatari government and the Muslim Brotherhood is one of mutual benefit, thus why the government has chosen to promote the Brotherhood within their society rather than expel them.

Lebanon and Hezbollah

There are also cases in which organizations that employ methods of violence do not face the consequence of being labeled “terrorist,” rather they are integrated within the Lebanese bureaucracy. One case of this political

inclusion is the group Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although Hezbollah’s ideology conflicts with Lebanon’s sovereignty, especially with regard to their desire to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon, Hezbollah and Lebanon have maintained a mutually beneficial relationship that ensures the security of both establishments. The Lebanese National Pact of 1943 is an agreement between Lebanese Christians and Muslims concerning the distribution of power among the varying religious groups represented within Lebanese society, which is predominantly Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and Maronite Christians.

As the largest party organization within Lebanese parliament, Hezbollah’s role represents the largest sectarian population within the country: Shi’a Muslims. Hezbollah was formed in 1980 in direct response to the Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. Given their relative success against Israel, Hezbollah has become Lebanon’s predominant defense against Israel: “Hezbollah has proved the single most effective adversary Israel has ever faced” (Chafik, 2013, p.6).

Essentially, Lebanon’s sovereignty relies on Hezbollah’s military presence along the Israeli border.

In addition to Hezbollah’s military

excursions against the Israeli defense forces, they are also deeply integrated into providing social welfare programs for its constituents: “The organization had gained widespread respect for its political integrity and social generosity and had just been responsible for the liberation of the country” (Early, 2006, p.124). Given the success and popularity of Hezbollah among the greater Lebanese community, they have proven to be a force to be reckoned with against the Lebanese government. Additionally, although Hezbollah is recognized by some nations as being a terrorist organization, their social work has transcended this label “by acting as a lifeline for the Lebanese Shi’a community” (Chafik, 2013, p.3). In fact, due to the large military superiority of Hezbollah in the Shi’a-dominated, southern region of Lebanon, the state was “unsure if it could even compel the national army to challenge the organization” (Early, 2006, p.124). Therefore, this threat of Hezbollah to the Lebanese parliament further incentivized Lebanon to include Hezbollah within the parliament in order to maintain control over Shi’a dominated regions.

One of the most important aspects of a successful social movement is to have a wide range of resources and social capital.

Attaining just that has been a struggle of the Islamic resistance movement, Hamas. Hamas emerged as a response to the rise in uncertainty among Palestinians with the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the Fatah Party’s failure to provide military protection and social services to Palestinians. However, since Hamas rose from uncertainty, they adopted a fundamental interpretation of Islam to support their resistance against Israel. The fundamentalist mindset of Hamas, which has led them to become very radical in their ideology and behavior, reduces their likelihood of mobilizing mass international support. Without mass support, Hamas’ ideals and goals will not be considered when attaining a resolution. In order to regain international support, Hamas redrafted their charter, Charter of 2017, to be less anti-Semitic and religious, and seem more inclusive and pragmatic, yet still remaining loyal to their original value (Charter, 2017). Given that the Charter of 2017 is relatively new, it is not clear whether Hamas will uphold the values and promises made to the international community; however, one can hope that the violence between the two sides comes to a halt so that diplomacy can be implemented, and a peaceful resolution can be attained.

Conclusion

The political implications behind labeling organizations as “terrorist” were strategically employed by several regimes throughout the Middle East in an effort to repress opposition organizations. This repression is often enacted and indiscriminately and disproportionately affects those organizations that do not engage in violence. The selectivity of the regimes with regard to the organizations they chose to repress is significant. When “terrorism” is ascribed to ideology it diminishes the political opportunities that accompany popular support. This theme of a terrorist ascription in the absence of violence is demonstrated through the exile and crackdown on the members of the Muslim Brotherhood by the Egyptian regime. The motivation behind this treatment of the Brotherhood is a result of the internal threat they posed to the incumbent regime as a result of their popular support among the populace.

On the contrary, regimes that expect to benefit from cooperation with organizations that promote violence will be incentivized to integrate these organizations into the state’s political institutions to maintain national stability. This case of integration is explored

through examining Hezbollah’s political role in Lebanon. Since Hezbollah’s military was capable of overtaking the Lebanese army, the Lebanese government granted Hezbollah with political legitimacy on the basis of ensuring the political stability of Lebanon. Additionally, Hezbollah is embraced because of the protection they provide Lebanon from external threats, such as Israel.

Ultimately, the underlying motivation regarding a state’s decision to either repress or embrace political opposition groups, regardless of their methods, is to provide stability and security for the incumbent regimes. On the one hand, if a state is threatened by the existence and support of an opposition organization, whether it be militarily or ideologically, the state will repress the organization by ascribing the “terrorist” label to the organization. On the other hand, if a state can reduce the threat of an opposition organization and can mutually benefit from cooperating with said organization, then the state will adopt the organization into its political institutions. Thus, while some states are able to minimize the threat of an opposing organization by embracing within the political institutions, other states choose to exclude these organizations completely in

order to consolidate power to maintain the status quo of their state

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