

RHODES COLLEGE SIGMA IOTA RHO

Modus Vivendi



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Letter from the Editors

Dear Readers,

On behalf of the editing staff, we are pleased to share the 26th edition of Sigma Iota Rho's Modus Vivendi journal. Originating from Latin, 'Modus Vivendi' means "way of life." Used frequently in the social sciences, this term refers to opposing parties agreeing to peacefully discuss their differences. From our perspective, we see our Modus Vivendi journal as the product of various actors & ideas converging to spread knowledge on an array of themes central to better understanding the world in which we live. Still one of few undergraduate international relations journals in the country, Modus Vivendi gives our International Studies Department students an outlet to showcase their hard work throughout their collegiate years & their passions for issues & stories much greater than themselves. We continue to be grateful that this journal receives great interest from the Rhodes community.

The process of this year's journal was more difficult than most given the health concern facing the globe. However, our staff has worked tirelessly despite unprecedented challenges & we tremendously thank our editing team & faculty sponsor, Professor Esen Kirdis, for their resiliency & determination.

We would like to formally congratulate the authors who are contributing essays to this year's journal: Grace Files, Jaclyn Flood,

Phyu Khine, Xiaojie Ji & Lily Roberts. Additionally, we would like to congratulate Jaclyn Flood, Kristen Morris, Caroline O'Connor, Sara Taylor & Sara Weeks for their international photographs that are dispersed throughout the journal. Photograph locations include Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, Morocco, Portugal & Spain.

Again, with great pride & appreciation, we would like to acknowledge & thank our editing team for their hard work & dedication to ensuring this year's Modus Vivendi exceeded expectations: Jaclyn Flood, Caitlin Gaine, Isabella Harden, Seongjoon Hwang, Tofu Schmude & Payton Smith. Lastly, we would like to extend gratitude to Professor Esen Kirdis for her guidance & support throughout this process as well as to the International Studies Department for allowing us to continue this annual student-led journal showcasing only some of the Department's talented students.

We hope you thoroughly enjoy this year's edition of Modus Vivendi & that these essays expand your knowledge & deepen your desire to continue learning about issues affecting our world. We thank you for supporting the Rhodes College International Studies Department.

Respectfully,

Sarah Eiland & Kristen Morris
Co-Editors-in-Chief, 2020

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Jaclyn Flood, Class of 2021

A European Regime on the Global Stage: Eurocentrism in International Refugee Law

Jaclyn Flood, 2021

The 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees govern today's international refugee regime. Through these documents, the UN responds to the challenge of how to protect refugees by imposing a Eurocentric refugee regime onto the international community. In this paper, I will first discuss the historical factors that influenced the text of these documents as well as the context in which they were written. Next, I will closely analyze the documents. In doing so, I will demonstrate how the UN recognizes the universality of fundamental rights and freedoms and encourages global participation and international cooperation in the protection of refugees while repeatedly prioritizing European interests over those of the rest of the world.

The 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol emerged out of Europe's tumultuous twentieth century (American Courts and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 2018). During the interwar period, several European states entered into

various, narrow refugee arrangements to protect distinct refugee populations originating from and arriving in Europe. The first significant agreement responded to Russian refugees fleeing the revolution and subsequent civil war in their home country and arriving in Western Europe. This influx of stateless persons prompted the High Commissioner for Refugees under the League of Nations in 1922 to begin issuing travel documents, later known as Nansen Passports, to Russian refugees (Holzer, 2012). When Armenian refugees fleeing genocide added to the refugee population in Europe, nine European states ratified the 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees (*Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees*, 1933). Although it lacked many accessions, the 1933 Convention left an indelible mark on the international refugee regime with its commitment to non-refoulement, setting the precedent "that refugees with valid objections should not be compelled

to return to their country of origin” (Goodwin-Gil, 2014, pp. 39-40). Consequently, when the United Nations (UN) endorsed this principle in 1946, it ushered in “a new era” of international law, in which non-refoulement remains a core component (Goodwin-Gil, p. 39). Thus, it is apparent that European refugee law represented a significant historical precedent for eventual UN agreements on refugees.

When the Second World War scattered tens of millions of people around the world, (Sigg, 2003) a refugee crisis of “unprecedented magnitude” confronted the newly-formed UN (Roy, 2006, p. 1125). The UN General Assembly reasoned a challenge of these proportions could only be resolved through international collaboration; hence, the UN established the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in 1947 (Read, 1951). The IRO was tasked with resolving refugee matters caused by World War II through the “repatriation, resettlement or temporary establishment of the refugees and displaced persons” covered by its Constitution (Holzer, p.33). The IRO’s Constitution was a revolutionary instrument in international refugee law both because of the breadth of people it

covered as well as its “use of the term ‘persecution’ in the context of a refugee definition” (Holzer, p.33). Although the UN established the IRO on a temporary basis, the challenge of providing protection for refugees would remain even after the IRO concluded its mission of resettling refugees from the Second World War.

Accordingly, in 1950 the UN established the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to continue the work of the IRO (Lewis, 2005). As the UNHCR website still states, the goal of its inception was “to help millions of Europeans who had fled or lost their homes” (UNHCR, *History of the UNHCR*, n.d.). The UNHCR was mandated with providing international protection and humanitarian assistance in addition to seeking permanent solutions for refugees as defined within its statute. This definition includes persons covered by previous arrangements for specific groups of refugees, such as the Russian, Armenian, and German refugees of the interwar period (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010). In order to fulfill these duties, the UNHCR was also charged with promoting and supervising the application of “international

conventions for the protection of refugees” (UNHCR, 1990, p. 362). Following the creation of the UNHCR, the UN Economic and Social Council determined that a consolidated international refugee agreement was the most effective way to protect persons who definitionally lacked the protection of their country of nationality. Therefore, it convened an *ad hoc* Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons to draft an international convention that would “supersede existing agreements” in response to the challenge of protecting refugees (Read, p.13).

10 of the 13 states represented on the *ad hoc* committee that drafted this ‘international’ convention were located in Europe or North America; not a single state from Africa was represented (UN Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, 1950). With the purpose of completing and signing the *ad hoc* committee’s draft, the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons assembled in Geneva in 1950. Among the 26 states represented at the Conference, 21 are current members of the European regional groups in the UN (Department for General Assembly and Conference Membership, n.d.). This heavily-European conference

produced the multilateral treaty known as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention). In the Convention, the UN defines the term ‘refugee,’ lays out the rights and freedoms of refugees, and dictates the role of states and the UNHCR in protecting those rights and freedoms (Office of the UNHCR, 1950).

As the Cold War progressed, “the refugee problem in Europe paled in comparison” to those in African and Asian states (Holzer, pp.37-38). Decolonization and proxy wars engendered new refugee populations that fell under the universal statute of the UNHCR but not the geographically-and temporally-limited definition in the Convention (Goodwin-Gill). Being in the midst of the Cold War, Western Europe and the United States were more eager to accept refugees fleeing Communist countries as they were seen as geopolitical pawns. At the same time, because African and Asian states viewed the 1951 Convention as immaterial to the refugee issues they were facing -- a testament to its Eurocentricity -- many states in the regions of those proxy wars declined to accede (Davies, 2008). Instead, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963 to

promote African solidarity and coordinate anti-colonialist efforts, decided to draft a regional convention. The OAU tailored their convention to address the challenges facing African states regarding the protection of refugees (South African History Online, 2019). In response, the UNHCR produced the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Protocol). With the Protocol, the UN removed the geographic and temporal limits of the Convention definition of the term “refugee.” With this revision, the UN sought to attract accession from non-European states (*Convention and Protocol*, 2010, p.46), thereby ensuring “that the 1951 Convention remained the principal international agreement on refugees” (Lewis, pp.67-90). Despite its role as an ‘amendment’ to the Convention, the Protocol is an independent instrument accessible to all UN member states regardless of whether they are parties to the Convention (Sigg, p.117). The states that sign onto the Protocol undertake “to apply the basic provisions of the Convention of 1951 without time limits” (Sigg, p.117). Thus, the Protocol “is tied to the letter and spirit of the Convention” (Sigg, p.117). Together, they constitute the chief governing documents of the international

refugee regime.

How does the UN, in the Convention and Protocol, respond to the challenge of protecting refugees? I will argue that the UN responds to this challenge by recognizing the universality of fundamental rights and freedoms. The UN also responds by encouraging global participation and international cooperation in the protection of refugees. At the same time, the UN’s response in the Convention and Protocol repeatedly prioritizes European interests over those of the rest of the world.

First, the UN responds to the challenge of protecting refugees by recognizing the universality of fundamental rights and freedoms. In the first clause of the Preamble to the Convention, the UN cites that “the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination” (*Convention and Protocol*, p.13). This clause stresses the universality of fundamental rights and freedoms. By emphasizing that all human beings are entitled to those fundamental rights and freedoms, the UN affirms that refugees are

deserving of such protection. However, this raises another challenge: refugees definitionally lack protection by their country of origin. In the same perambulatory clause, the UN emphasizes that the international community has affirmed the universality of human rights, not once but twice, through the UN Charter *and* the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Therefore, the UN implies that members of the international community that acknowledged the universality of those rights are obligated to uphold them. In doing so, the UN responds to the dilemma of how to protect the basic rights of definitionally unprotected people.

In addition to recognizing the universality of fundamental rights and freedoms, the UN responds to the challenge of protecting refugees by encouraging global participation in the Convention. First, the UN includes in the Convention a “Federal Clause,” which outlines how the Convention applies in federal and non-unitary states (*Convention and Protocol*, pp.34-35). The Federal Clause sets the Convention apart from previous UN agreements (Read). In 1951, the Deputy High Commissioner of the UNHCR referred to this clause as an “innovation” that would “facilitate the accession of Federal States to the

Convention” (Read, p.15). By appealing to federal states, the UN invites widespread participation in the effort to protect refugees. Moreover, the UN permits unilateral reservations to certain parts of the Convention (*Convention and Protocol*, p.39), including “the articles dealing with social and economic rights” of refugees (Goodwin-Gil, pp.39-40). States, especially developing ones, had the most reservations regarding these articles of the Convention (Goodwin-Gil, pp.39-40). The UN encourages accession amongst these states by assuaging their socio-economic concerns with the reservations clause. Thereby, the UN responds to the challenge of protecting refugees by encouraging global participation in the protection of their fundamental rights and freedoms, even if that means compromising certain social and economic rights of refugees.

As well as promoting global participation, the UN encourages international cooperation in response to the challenge of protecting refugees. For example, the UN recognizes that because “the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries...a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature

cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation” (*Convention and Protocol*, p.13). In this perambulatory clause, the UN cites the disproportionate distribution of refugees as one aspect of the challenge of protecting refugees. In response to this obstacle, the UN emphasizes the importance of international cooperation and establishes burden-sharing as a key component of the international refugee regime. Similarly, the UN acknowledges the diplomatic strains of providing refugee protection, but insists “that all States, recognizing the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything within their power to prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension between States” (*Convention and Protocol*, p.13). The UN observes that the difficulties of providing protection to refugees presents an opportunity for resentment to form between states. Therefore, the UN responds by warning states of the humanitarian cost of such “tension” and urges them to strive for international cooperation.

Despite recognizing the international nature of the refugee situation, the UN’s response in the *Convention and Protocol* repeatedly prioritizes European interests. In response to the challenge of

protecting refugees, the UN prioritized European interests by incorporating aspects of previous refugee agreements into the *Convention*. First, in the *Convention’s* definition of the term ‘refugee,’ the UN includes anyone who “has been considered a refugee” (*Convention and Protocol*, p.14) under six previous agreements. All five of the League of Nations agreements referenced in the *Convention* definition protected specific groups of European refugees (*Convention and Protocol*, p.14). The final agreement the UN mentions in this clause, the IRO Constitution, particularly ensured the protection of refugees from Germany, Austria, and Spain, as well as those fleeing Nazi, Fascist, and Falangist regimes, all of which were centered in Europe (*Constitution of the International Refugee Organization*, 1946, p. 12).

Consequently, the UN prioritizes the protection of European refugees by specifically including them in the *Convention* definition. Furthermore, exclusively European states ratified the first five out of six agreements mentioned (Documents from the League of Nations Archives, 2003, pp.71-73). By referencing these agreements in the *Convention*, the UN prioritizes the interests of European states in response to the challenge of protecting refugees. In

addition to incorporating the subjects of previous refugee agreements into the Convention, the UN continued the recognition of “travel documents issued to refugees under previous international agreements by parties thereto” (*Convention and Protocol*, p.28). This clause refers to the ‘Nansen passport’ of the 1933 Convention. This Convention, ratified exclusively by European states (*Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees*), mandated the issue of refugee travel documents to Russian and Armenian refugees (Sigg, p.115). The reference to the 1933 Convention in the 1951 Convention imposes the provisions of a previous agreement pertaining to and ratified by Europeans onto the rest of the world. Therefore, the UN prioritizes the interests of Europeans when responding to the challenge of protecting refugees.

Aside from referencing previous refugee agreements, the UN prioritizes European interests by including a temporal restriction in the Convention. Namely, the Convention states that anyone seeking protection as a refugee under the Convention must be fleeing persecution “as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951” (*Convention and Protocol*, p. 28). In the referenced time period, “refugees of European origin”

constituted the vast majority of the internationally-displaced population (UNHCR, 1990, p. ix). This restriction reveals “the reluctance of states to sign a ‘blank cheque’ for unknown numbers of future refugees” who may or may not be of European origin (Goodwin-Gil, p. 37). Consequently, the temporal restriction in the Convention reflects the UN’s inclination to prioritize the protection of European refugees and cater to the interests of European states reluctant to accept non-European refugees. Although the UN created the Protocol without the temporal restriction, it did not require all signatories to the Convention to adhere to the updated agreement. Therefore, the UN continues to exempt states from protecting refugees who were displaced after the 1951 dateline. Considering such, the UN prioritizes European interests in response to the challenge of protecting refugees.

Similar to the temporal restriction, the UN included an optional geographic restriction in the Convention that prioritizes European interests in response to the challenge of protecting refugees. Specifically, the UN gave signatories to the Convention the option to further restrict the definition of the term ‘refugee’ to those fleeing “events occurring *in Europe*”

[emphasis added] before 1 January 1951” (*Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 2010, p. 32). Therefore, even if refugees from Asian and African states were fleeing events before the temporal limitation, states party to the Convention were not necessarily obligated to protect them. The geographic constraint demonstrates how “the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol were not primarily developed to respond to Asian and African concerns about refugee problems” (Davies, pp. 703-728). Instead of responding to those concerns, the UN catered to European apprehensions about non-Europeans adding on to the already ‘unprecedented’ number of refugees in Europe. Like the temporal restriction, the UN continues to allow states to apply the geographic restrictions to their protection of refugees. By giving states the option to commit solely to the protection of European refugees, the UN prioritizes European interests over those of the rest of the world.

Although the UN created the Protocol without temporal or geographic restrictions, the timing of this response to the challenge of protecting refugees benefitted European foreign policy interests. In the 1967 Protocol, the UN concedes

that “the Convention...covers only those persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951...[and] new refugee situations have arisen since the Convention was adopted [such] that refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the scope of the Convention” (*Convention and Protocol*, 1951, p.51). As the Cold War progressed, “new refugee situations” indeed arose: between 1964 and 1967, 1.33 million refugees emerged out of Communist China and into the international refugee regime (Dataviz Team, n.d.). Simultaneously, a political motive for the UN to respond to the challenge of protecting these new refugees also materialized. Western democracies viewed the emergence of refugee populations fleeing Communism in the 1960’s as propaganda that politicians could exploit to further vilify the Soviet Union and communist ideology (Loescher). Therefore, the UN’s response to the challenge of protecting non-European refugees still prioritized Western interests due to the political timing of this response.

Likewise, despite providing an *option* for states to remove the most explicit geographic and temporal restrictions of the Convention, the Protocol’s lack of substantial changes to the

Convention reveals the UN's continued neglect for non-European refugees. To be sure, the UN expressed its "desire that equal status should be enjoyed by all refugees covered by the definition in the Convention irrespective of the dateline 1 January 1951" and the corresponding geographic limitation (*Convention and Protocol*, 1951, p.51). However, the UN failed to require states party to the Convention to adhere to the Protocol. Furthermore, aside from lifting those limitations, the Protocol neglects to adapt any "traditional concepts and legal definitions [of the Convention that] the office had used in Europe" (Loescher, p. 39) to the refugee challenges facing non-European states. The Protocol therefore only nominally removed the obstacles to protecting non-European refugees. Ultimately, the UN failed to meaningfully respond to the needs of refugees globally, instead prioritizing European interests.

This project relates to the broader historical issue of Eurocentrism within international refugee law. Through the Convention and Protocol, the chief governing documents of the international refugee regime, the UN universalizes Eurocentric definitions and provisions regarding the protection of refugees. First, the UN recognizes

that certain rights and freedoms are universal. Moreover, the UN encourages international participation and cooperation in the protection of those rights and freedoms for refugees. Together, these acts demonstrate that the UN realizes the global scope of the refugee situation. Despite this, the Convention and Protocol are based on a half-century of European refugee agreements. Furthermore, the timing of the creation of the Protocol reveals the UN's Eurocentric motives in removing the geographic and temporal restrictions. Finally, the UN failed to adapt the Convention and Protocol to thoroughly respond to the challenges of protecting non-European refugees, continuing to prioritize European interests over the refugee challenges facing the rest of the world. In doing so, the UN imposes a Eurocentric refugee regime onto the international community.

The origins of refugees as well as the causes forcing them from their homes have changed in the last 50 years, but the documents intended to protect them have not. Following World War II, refugees of European origin made up the vast majority of the internationally-displaced population. Today, however, over half of the world refugee population

originate from Syria, Afghanistan, or South Sudan (Dataviz Team, 2019). According to the same UNHCR study, the top refugee-hosting countries are Turkey, Pakistan, Uganda, and Sudan, because 80% of refugees reside “in countries neighboring their countries of origin.” The same study concluded only 2 out of every 7 forcibly-displaced people are covered by the UNHCR’s mandate. Many of these refugees were not forced from their homes for the specific reasons of persecution which warrant refugee protection under the 1951 Convention. Instead, new refugee populations stemming from civil war, gender-based violence, and climate change have emerged (Loescher). Therefore, significant reform is required to adapt the currently-eurocentric international refugee regime in such a way that it can effectively protect 21st-century refugees on a global scale.

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Chefchaouen, Morocco
Kristen Morris, Class of 2020



Mesta, Chios, Greece
Sara Weeks, Class of 2020

The Intersection of Security & Insecurity in Bosnia & Rwanda: A Feminist Critique of Traditional Theories of State Security

Grace Files, 2021

Introduction – Theories of State Security

Traditional theories of state security hold that in order to provide security for citizens, a nation must first ensure that the state, as an entity, is secure. This often takes the form of physical action: states must go to war, obtain land, and erect barriers to protect from outside threats. The effect of such tangible policies, more than to secure any pre-existing, physical form of the state, is to secure the socially constructed identity of the nation. By fighting to maintain and create physical boundaries, states construct their identities in opposition to “outsiders” located past those physical boundaries. Due to its socially constructed nature, state identity is constantly in flux and requires consistent action to “secure” the state. In this context, traditional theories of state security work not to protect any physical entity, but rather to reify socially constructed state identities.

Understanding this context, feminist theories of state security challenge traditional notions that state security

must be prioritized to ensure security for citizens. Oftentimes, feminist scholars point out, efforts to secure the physical boundaries of a state result in increased instability and insecurity for citizens, particularly vulnerable citizen populations. One such vulnerable population is women. In their efforts to secure socially constructed borders, states overlook the security of their citizens as a secondary priority, thereby endangering women and other marginalized groups.

To illustrate this point, I will examine two cases from the late 20th century: the Bosnian War and the Rwandan Genocide. Both cases involved ethno-national conflicts in which divided ethnic groups fought for control of the physical state—or, more accurately, the socially constructed borders that make up the “physical” state. In this fight to secure the physical state, each opposing group struggled to control state identity and the ethnic identity of citizens within the state. Both cases saw group efforts to secure the state that led to extreme insecurity

of citizens in the form of wartime rape.

Wartime rape in this case refers to patterns of rape by soldiers that result in increased instances of sexual violence compared to peacetime (Gottschall 2004). Historical minimization of wartime rape has painted the violation as an inevitable part of war and a personal sexual act (Farwell 2004). However, largely due to the Bosnian War and the Rwandan Genocide, the international political sphere has increasingly recognized rape as a weapon of war and a crime against humanity (Farwell 2004). While rape victims can be both male and female, in both cases examined rape was disproportionately committed against women, and women comprised the vast majority of victims (Farwell 2004). Therefore, efforts to secure the state in both the Bosnian War and the Rwandan Genocide resulted in high rates of gendered violence and insecurity.

An examination of these cases will illustrate how underlying patriarchal norms and traditional conceptualizations of state security contributed to gendered violence against women which resulted in long-lasting insecurity for each state. This finding suggests that in order to avoid similar iterations of violence and insecurity, the

contributing underlying norms must be recognized and addressed. This paper will begin with a brief overview of both the Bosnian War and the Rwandan Genocide before examining the characteristics each conflict had in common, including goals, methodology, and results. After reviewing how struggles to maintain state security led to increased insecurity in both cases, I will turn to an examination of the underlying social norms and thought patterns that allowed for the perpetration of violence under the guise of ensuring state security.

The Bosnian War (1992-1995)

The late 20th century was a time of instability for Yugoslavia, a territory that included what is today Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the crumbling of the Soviet bloc and the weakening of communist regimes across Eastern Europe gave way to nationalist movements, and the republic began to fracture into multiple independent states. This uncertainty saw state identities in flux, leaving them open to redefinition. Many ethnic groups began to promote nationalism because, as Snyder describes, “During a time of uncertainty, nationalism had the power to offer millions of Yugoslavians a renewed

sense of security because it was based on a traditional set of values that included an idealized past, religion, kin, and common blood” (Snyder et. al 2006; 188). This turn to nationalism came with a revival of patriarchal attitudes as emphasis was placed on the legitimation of male political power in efforts to reify changing state identity (Snyder et. al 2006).

Eventually, patriarchal ethno-nationalism led to armed conflict amid ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina as Muslims and Croats pushed for state independence from Yugoslavia and Serbs fought to remain part of the republic. After a vote, Bosnia and Herzegovina officially left Yugoslavia and declared independence in 1992. Ethnic Serbs militarized and began to fight to return to a ‘greater Serbia.’ This fight involved a campaign of ethnic cleansing in which Serbian forces systemically raped Muslim and Croat women (Mukamana and Brysiewicz 2008); estimates put the number of women assaulted during the Bosnian war between 10,000 and 60,000 (Sharlach 2000).

The campaign of genocide through rape was unique during the Bosnian war in its emphasis on impregnating the rape victims (Sharlach 2000). Because ethnic identity was

culturally considered patrilineal, the children of Muslim and Croat women who were forcibly impregnated by Serbian soldiers were also considered Serbian (Snyder et. al 2006). This was a particularly brutal violation because southeastern European social conventions held female purity to high standards and viewed women as representative of national future due to their reproductive capacities (Snyder et. al 2006). Snyder summarizes, “Thus, sexual violence against women became a tool of genocide for destroying the enemy’s honor, lineage, and nation. Because these symbolic meanings of the rapes were shared among Serbs, Muslims, and Croats, sexual violence became an extremely effective weapon of war” (Snyder et. al 2006; 190-191).

The Rwandan Genocide (1994)

The Rwandan Genocide was an ethno-national conflict that took place in 1994 over a period of 3 months, during which time between 800,000 and 1,000,000 people—largely members of the Tutsi minority group—were slaughtered by the forces of the majority Hutu ethnic group (Mukamana and Brysiewicz 2008). Parallel to the Bosnian War, the

Rwandan Genocide was a conflict between ethnic groups as one group fought to control state identity, thereby maintaining state security for members of said ethnic group. Additionally, the Rwandan Genocide saw systemic rape of the minority group by the majority group as Hutu men systemically raped Tutsi women, similarly to the systemic rape of Croat and Muslim women by Serb men in Bosnia (Mukamana and Brysiewicz 2008).

During the Rwandan Genocide, somewhere between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped (Sharlach 2000). However, unlike the Bosnian War in which male soldiers intentionally focused on impregnating victims, rape during the Rwandan genocide usually preceded murder or was intended to kill victims by way of fatal injuries (Sharlach 2000). The deliberate transmission of HIV/AIDS to Tutsi women was a unique tactic used by Hutu soldiers that often resulted in prolonged suffering and death (Mukamana and Brysiewicz 2008). Furthermore, within a cultural context that tied girlhood to virginity and womanhood to marriage, many Tutsi women who were victimized lost their sense of identity as either women or girls, leaving them on the margins of society (Mukamana and Brysiewicz

2008). Rape victims were further marginalized by a society that viewed them as complicit in the rape; women were often accused of selling their bodies to the enemy (Sharlach 2000).

Common Goals, Common Methods, Common Results

In the Bosnian War and the Rwandan Genocide, each conflict presents a case in which fighting took place in liminal states (Hayden 2000). Political upheaval and government changes called into question fundamental aspects of already-established state identity, which presented both a threat and an opportunity for ethnic groups living within those states. As state identity was called into question, opposing groups sought to secure their normative concepts of the state—what should the state look like? Who should be in power? In this way, both Serbs in Bosnia and Hutu in Rwanda were fighting for common goals: to assert their conceptualizations of state security. Both groups utilized common methodology when they undertook campaigns to secure the state for their respective ethnic groups by ending co-existence with other ethnicities, and rape became a powerful weapon in this context

(Hayden 2000).

Feminist theory holds that rape is about power rather than sexuality, although it is a gendered form of violence (Gottschall 2004). During the Bosnian War and the Rwandan Genocide power was exercised through the sexualized violence of rape, which was used as both a weapon and strategy of war (Farwell 2004). In both cases, the underlying goal of rape lay in ethnic cleansing (Snyder et. al 2006). Thus, the violence of rape operated in three ways: as interpersonal violence that served to reconstitute the masculine identity of the perpetrators, as political violence that served to subvert or uphold existing hierarchies, and as a “cog in the global political economy” as groups fought to redefine state identity (Henry 2016; 51).

Rape was an effective method because it attacked the coherence of the victimized groups in multiple ways (Gottschall 2004). Women killed or infected with deadly STDs in the course of rape prevented the ethnic group from reproducing, thereby threatening group future. Similarly, women ostracized from their communities after their victimization contributed to a breakdown of family and community ties. Mass rape also led to forced migration and the physical

removal of ethnic groups from the state (Snyder et. al 2006). Those women who became pregnant became part of a “genetic imperialism” as the children they gave birth to were considered members of the ethnic group that had assaulted their mothers (Farwell 2004; 395). Mukamana and Brysiewicz explain, “When rape is committed on a massive scale, the social fabric of family and community unravels exponentially, weakening people’s capacity to resist” (Mukamana and Brysiewicz 2008). Thus, wartime rape worked to weaken and eradicate targeted ethnic groups by destroying group cohesion through targeting identity (Farwell 2004). This was particularly effective in a context in which questions of state security were fundamentally bound up with questions of who would get to define state identity.

Clearly, then, the struggle to defend state security had common results in both cases in that it created massive levels of insecurity for marginalized ethnic groups and, particularly, for women in both the Bosnian War and the Rwandan Genocide. The insecurity created through violence continues to affect both states today, exhibited through forms such as poverty and lack of access to necessary medicine and childcare

(Farwell 2004). Trauma was compounded in a culture in which women were considered dishonored after rape, leading to lasting ostracization from their ethnic communities that contributed to a long-term breakdown of community ties (Sharlach 2000). Additionally, the trauma suffered by women impregnated during rape would be passed on to the next generation as their children experienced the after-effects of that trauma (Mukamana and Brysiewicz 2008). Thus, despite the goals of each conflict to ensure state security, the results were to plunge each state deeper into insecurity.

Cultural Norms – Women and the State

Both the Bosnian War and the Rwandan Genocide were ethno-national conflicts that involved fighting in order to, ostensibly, ensure state security for one ethnic group over another. Both conflicts took place within the same time period, and both conflicts saw the militarized ethnic group using rape as a strategic weapon to commit genocide. However, these two conflicts took place in completely different regions, with completely different histories and cultures. Therefore, it is important

to examine what cultural pretexts Rwanda and Bosnia had in common that allowed such similarity when ethnic tensions led to violence.

Most importantly, both states shared a deeply embedded patriarchal society and a history of structural gender inequality (Snyder et. al 2006). Family structure was patrilineal, and women were primarily wives and mothers. Heavy emphasis placed on female reproductive capacities led to heavy emphasis on female purity, making women both a source of honor and shame for families (Snyder et. al 2006). Thus, women were constructed as a defining source of group identity who had to be protected and controlled by men in order to ensure community welfare. This construction of women mirrored the construction of the state itself, which was often regarded in feminized terms as something to be protected and policed by men. Mothers, then, were both the property and the embodiment of the nation (Snyder et. al 2006).

Masculine protectionism viewed both the state and women as passive entities to be shaped by male action. Women were vessels for the male “seed” of nation, which relied on the patriarchal idea that the father determines child identity; women were passive receptacles that added

nothing (Farwell 2004). Farwell explains, “In this essentialist patriarchal construction, men are both the arbiters and the protectors of boundaries for women and for nations. Thus, rape is not only an attack against women, it is also an assault on the honor of men” (Farwell 2004; 395). It was the perception of female sexuality as public property that made it possible to view an attack on an individual woman as an attack against an entire community (Mukamana and Brysiewicz 2008).

The underlying norm in each state that allowed wartime rape to effectively attack group cohesion, then, was the idea that the honor—and the very identity—of the group depended on the honor of its women and the masculinity of its men (Hayden 2000). Group identity was called into question as female honor was violated and men, unable to prevent these atrocities, were emasculated (Gottschall 2004). Because men defined ethnic identity and women were male property, an attack on women was an attack on male ethnic identity that destabilized group identity as a whole.

These socio-cultural norms additionally lent themselves to the conflation of women’s bodies with

national territory. Hayden elaborates, “Violated bodies are constructed as the ethnic territories themselves, with rape as the marker that symbolically defines the female body as itself territory while also excluding the now polluted body from geographical territory in which it is no longer welcome” (Hayden 2000; 32). Both women and the state were passive entities that had to be protected and defined by men. An attack on one, then, was an attack on the other. Thus, conceptualizations of state security were largely bound up in gendered conceptions of identity and how identity should be defined.

Conclusion – Implications for Traditional Understandings of State Security

What is important to note in both the case of the Bosnian War and the Rwandan Genocide is that the underlying norms and thought patterns for conceptualizations of state security were the same norms and thought patterns that were used to justify rape as a war strategy. Traditional conceptualizations of state security hold that the state is a passive entity that can be possessed and influenced by actors. This conceptualization is inherently gendered, as the actors are primarily

male due to the masculinized nature of military culture and the historical exclusion of women from the political sphere. The masculine nature of the actors pairs with a feminized conceptualization of the state, which is often portrayed as a mother that must be protected in order to continue to produce her (male) children, who shoulder the burden of continuing to protect and reproduce national identity. This protection and reproduction of national identity is what constitutes state security, as a state is only truly secure when it can unify under a secure identity.

It was this traditional, patriarchal conception of state security that led Serbs in Bosnia and Hutu in Rwanda on campaigns of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Once their respective ethno-nationalist state identities came under threat, each group felt the only way to obtain state security over a passive, feminized state was through physical action. This physical action took the form of gendered violence as each group fought to secure national territory and political control in order to reconstruct and reify state identity along ethnic lines. It was this traditional view of the state as a subject that must be dominated and protected by men in order to ensure security that paradoxically led to

extreme upheaval and insecurity.

Furthermore, the same mentalities and ideologies that led to campaigns of violence to ensure state security led to the targeting of women and the use of wartime rape as a strategy. Women occupied the same culturally feminized position as the state; in both Rwanda and Bosnia, they were largely viewed as passive subjects whose main purpose was to reproduce men for the continuity of national identity. This led to the conflation of female bodies with national territory. Women of opposing ethnic groups represented an infringement on the purity of state territory that had to be either removed (by way of murder, intentional infection with deadly disease, or forced migration) or converted to reproduce men of the other ethnic group (by way of forced pregnancy). Wartime rape against women was particularly effective in dismantling group cohesion because of the role women played as the subjects upon which men acted out their conceptions of national identity. Without control over female bodies, men could not control their ethnic and national identities, which meant they could not control state identity and therefore could not ensure state security. Simply put: whoever controlled female bodies also

controlled state identity and, thereby, state security. In both Bosnia and Rwanda, the fundamental assumptions underlying traditional notions of state security and, more specifically, how to ensure state security directly contributed to increased insecurity and violence against women. Understanding how these two phenomena are linked problematizes traditional conceptions of state security. The inherently patriarchal roots of traditionalist notions mean that struggles over state security that rely on these notions will always be gendered and will likely marginalize women. Thus, any argument that state security—as it is traditionally conceptualized—must be obtained before women (and other marginalized citizens) within the state can be secure is fundamentally flawed. Instead, state security must begin with the security of citizens, and patriarchal notions of the state that contribute to the marginalization of women must be disregarded and dismantled, particularly in times of conflict.

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Prague, Czech Republic
Caroline O'Connor, Class of 2020



Al Haouz, Morocco

Kristen Morris, Class of 2020

U.S. Export Control Regime in Relation to China

Xiaojie Ji, 2021

Introduction

Export control regimes have become increasingly important in international trade. While exports involve shipment and transmission of products, technology and services out of the United States or to a foreign person (whether individuals or corporations), export controls aim at regulating and restricting the release of certain critical technologies and information. Through its export control system, the U.S. government can protect national security by limiting foreign access to the most sensitive technology and weapons that could be used in international terrorism (*Achilleas and Tamada 2017*). The U.S. today has developed a sophisticated export control regime targeting China, especially with respect to dual-use goods and services that have a commercial and military purpose. In 2019, the Trump Administration prohibited the export of telecom goods and services to Huawei Technologies Co, Ltd. (Huawei), a Chinese-owned telecom supplier and one of the largest telecom businesses in the

globe.

To study export restriction against Huawei from U.S.' perspective, this paper is divided into four sections. In the first part, it provides an overview of the U.S. export control regime and its evolution from liberalization to strict restriction with respect to China. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the primary agency for export control regulation, contains an Entity List for prohibited goods and services for various security and economic concerns. U.S. export to China was largely liberalized in the 1990s, while in the 21st century, the U.S. government under Donald Trump adopts a stricter export regulation especially on telecom goods and services. Consistent with Eisner's theory of policy entrepreneur, President Trump has emphasized China's "unfair" trade practices and advocated for a stricter restriction on China ever since he launched his presidential campaign. In the second part, the paper studies the rationale behind the export liberalization and stricter export control in relation to China. During

the liberalization in the 1990s, the national security threat from China's IP theft was minimal, and business demanded the government to open its trade with China to expand its consumer market. Though it has gradually become one of the U.S.' most important trading partners, China today is regarded as a greater threat to U.S. national security as one of its leading businesses, Huawei, is accused of violating intellectual property rights (IPR). China also challenges U.S. supremacy in the telecom industry, especially regarding fifth generation (5G) technology. The third part of this paper assesses the impact of the U.S. export control regime on its domestic industries and economy. During the liberalization on bilateral trade, U.S. companies gained competitive advantage in the large Chinese telecom markets, generating massive revenue. The export control regime today, in contrast, has risks and limitations. It will cost business opportunities in a huge, lucrative market in China, and potentially impede cooperation and technological innovation. In the fourth section, the paper looks at the recent development of the regime. While President Trump is leaning towards reconciliation by issuing a temporary general license to Huawei, Congress has a bipartisan

support for a stricter restriction on Huawei. Having examined the U.S. export control in relation to Huawei and China, this paper concludes, that a strict export control regime reflects the U.S.' zero-sum mentality in global trade and technological development, which aims to protect U.S. national security and maintain U.S. supremacy in telecom technology, although it comes at the cost of collateral damage to the U.S. economy and its domestic companies.

Overview of the U.S. Export Control Regime

The U.S. has a specific set of regulations and agencies to regulate export for national security and foreign policy objectives. In a globalized world, the free movement of goods and technologies can be used for hostile purposes, which conflict with national interest and national security. For this reason, it is important to open the market and conduct trade without impeding the safety of the country and people. State suppliers of goods and technologies develop export control regimes to regulate international trade specific to sensitive and critical goods and technologies. This regime aims to facilitate trade among friendly and reliable states

and prevent hostile and dangerous states, terrorist organizations and individuals from acquiring sensitive items. It can also be implicitly applied by states to protect their economies or to slow the technological development of their enemies or competitors (*Achilleas and Tamada 2017*). Particularly in the U.S., export control regimes are developed to protect national security by denying access for potential enemies to its competitive, high-technology products such as advanced materials, telecommunication equipment, and dual-use goods. Dual-use goods and technologies are those being used both commercially and militarily, and in the U.S. they are subject to licensing requirements. The Bureau of Industry and Security in the U.S. Department of Commerce maintains an Entity List of over 120 dual-use items that are controlled under a set of regulations named Export Administration Regulation (EAR). There are several other government agencies responsible for export control regulation in different areas of concern, including the Directorate of Defense Trade Control (DDTC) under the Department of State which regulates the exports of munitions-related merchandise and services (*Seyoum 2017*). BIS remains the primary actor

in regulating the export of dual-use items, such as telecom equipment. BIS's Office of Export Enforcement investigates end-users of controlled commodities to determine compliance with license conditions. To this end, BIS maintains the Entity List of certain foreign persons—including businesses, research institutions, and individuals—that are subject to specific license requirements under the License Review Policy (*Burke 2012*). The Entity List also specifies the license requirement that it imposes on each listed person.

The export control on telecom goods and services was minimal in the 1990s, largely as a result of the government's pro-business interest. Within the context of China's expanding economic and military capabilities, of growing technological diffusion, and of the weakening of the multilateral export control framework, Washington took a broad reform effort to streamline its export control. Transitioning toward a socialist market economy, China also engaged in a program of reform and liberalization of its domestic telecom sectors, which opened major economic opportunities in China for U.S. companies. Prior to 1994, the export of advanced telecommunications equipment to

China required an individual validated license, namely case-to-case authorization by the U.S. Commerce Department. In 1994, the U.S. implemented a liberalization on “virtually all telecommunications products through a new general license” (Meijer 2016). General license exemption (GLX), later called temporary general license, allowed the transfer of goods and services without individual validated license issued by the Commerce Department. The initial impetus for this liberalization came from the Telecommunications Industry Association and AT&T Inc., which were pushing to lift the restrictions on the export of digital switches and fiber optics to China. As a result of trade liberalization with China, the total value of U.S. telecommunications equipment exports to China has grown at a much higher rate since 1990, increasing from 250 million in 1985 to almost 2500 million in 2000 (Trading Economics). Since then, China has become one of the U.S.’ most important trading partners. In 2020, China is the U.S.’ biggest importer and the third largest export market (United States Census Bureau)

The U.S. export control regime today is characterized by long delays

in obtaining licensure and increasing incidents of denials. The Trump Administration has raised national security concerns over global supply chains of advanced technology products, such as information, communications, and telecommunications (ICT) equipment, where China is a major global consumer and supplier. The percentage of total ICT goods exports to China reached its peak of \$30.72 million in 2006, and since then it has been steadily dropping to \$27 million in 2017 and \$18 million in 2018 (The World Bank 2019; Trade Map 2018). Explaining the transition from liberalization to a strict export control regime, the most predominant factor is Huawei. In January 2019, U.S. federal prosecutors began investigating Huawei, the biggest Chinese telecoms equipment provider, for allegedly stealing technology from American carrier T-Mobile US Inc. A 13-count indictment, including bank fraud and wire fraud, was unsealed on January 28th in federal court in Brooklyn, New York. On May 15, 2019, U.S. president Trump issued Executive Order 13873, which authorized the federal government to ban certain ICT transactions deemed to pose an “undue risk” (Morrison 2019). On May 16, BIS announced that it would add

Huawei and 68 of its affiliates to its Entity List. As a result, U.S. exporters are prohibited from exporting or transferring any commodity, software or technology to Huawei, unless authorized by a BIS license. The license may be denied if “the sale or transfer would harm U.S. national security or foreign policy interests,” and its review policy is marked with the “presumption of denial” (*U.S. Department of Commerce*). According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the export restriction is based on Huawei’s alleged violations of the International Emergency Economic Power Act by providing prohibited financial services to Iran and obstruction of justice in connection with the investigation of those alleged violations (*Gebreyesus, 2019*).

Rationale of Export Control Regime: Changing Perspective of National Interest

During liberalization in the 1990s, the effect of free, bilateral trade is thought to be positive. This reasoning can be summarized as follows: first, the growing international and domestic pressures from U.S. allies and businesses to liberalize the export restriction in order to gain access to the large Chinese market; secondly,

due to technology diffusion and the accessibility of telecom equipment from third parties, the existing export controls would hamper U.S. economic interests without restricting China’s ability to obtain such technologies; third, given the interdependence between the government and the commercial industry, the government must streamline export controls in order to maintain a vibrant commercial high-tech industry which is able to lead the global supply chain (*Meijer 2016*). The pro-business government therefore responded to the industry demand by loosening its export restriction to China in pursuit of economic gains.

The rationale behind the strict export control regime today is multidimensional. First and foremost, although there is an economic incentive to trade with China, the U.S. is also concerned with the national security threat and economic loss from IPR violation. President Trump has also been an active policy entrepreneur by campaigning particularly on the issue of trade with China. One of his campaign themes was to stop China’s unfair trade practices and IP theft, and since he entered the White House, he issued a series of executive orders and memos concerning the U.S.-China trade. In

August 2019, President Trump signed a memorandum directing the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), a government agency responsible for developing and recommending trade policies, to investigate China's practices that "may be unreasonable or discriminatory and that may be harming American intellectual property rights" (*Luo 2017; Executive Orders and Memoranda 2018*).

According to the congressional research on the cost of IP theft, U.S. firms have expressed concern over pressures they often face from Chinese government entities to share technology and IPR with their Chinese partners. U.S. IP industries also complain that piracy rates in China remain unacceptably high and that the resulting economic losses are significant. The USTR press release estimated annual U.S. economic losses from China's "unfair" IPR policies at \$50 billion (*Morrison 2019*).

While the U.S. is concerned with the cost of the IP violation and the threat to national security, the U.S. also has an interest in maintaining its supremacy in the fifth generation (5G) network race. The supply and demand factor in the telecom equipment market prompts the U.S. to restrict export to Huawei in order to potentially slow down its telecom

development. Smartphones are becoming the primary means by which many consumers access the Internet, and the increase of demand for mobile data requires U.S. mobile carriers and telecom industries continually invest in network upgrades. Many U.S. mobile carriers, such as AT&T and Verizon, are planning to activate the 5G network by the end of 2019 (*Forden 2018, Streatfeild 2018*). And yet by March 2020, only select areas have access to 5G network. AT&T has also launched 5G network for customers and business separately. For example, while New York and Nashville have AT&T 5G for business, customers still do not have 5G network for their daily uses. Only three cities have the comprehensive 5G coverage: Chicago, Cleveland, and Minneapolis (*Looper, 2020*). 5G network is expected to yield significant economic benefits, creating up to 3 million new jobs and adding \$500 billion to the nation's gross domestic product (GDP). It is thus suggested by the Congress Research Service that Congress should consider policies to protect U.S. telecom networks, including trade restrictions on foreign technology providers. Congress may also "consider policies that support 5G deployment while also protecting

national and local interest, in order to modernize industries, give US companies an advantage in the global economy, and yield long-term economic gains for the US” (*Gallagher and DeVine 2019*). Since Huawei relies on U.S. products and software to build its 5G telecom equipment and high-end semiconductor chips (*Whalen 2019*), limiting Huawei’s access to U.S. telecom goods and services is expected to slow down its telecom development process, which in turn helps the U.S. telecom service providers gain more leverage in the global market.

Impact of Export Control Regime

Trade liberalization is conducive to the growth and expansion of world trade. Scientific and technological research centers are located throughout the globe, and trade liberalization makes it possible for technology collaboration and innovation to foster economic development (*Seyoum 2017*).

According to a 1994 briefing paper of the Commerce Department, trade liberalization would help U.S. companies to be competitive in the large Chinese telecom markets. Similarly, as mentioned in a US Government Accountability Office report, the market for telecom equipment in China had grown so

quickly since the removal of most export restrictions on American telecom equipment that tens of millions of dollars’ worth of telecom technologies were sold to China by U.S. companies, greatly expanding the United States’ own technological industrial capabilities (*Meijer 2016*).

By comparison, the restrictive export regime costs U.S. business opportunities in overseas markets. Instead of boosting U.S. national security, it is contributing to increased sales to China by foreign competitors at the expense of U.S. firms (*Seyoum 2017*). Despite U.S. warnings over national security concerns and potential IP theft, many countries have already welcomed Huawei into their networks. Others, including the United Kingdom, are considering how best to incorporate Huawei technology in parts of their 5G networks (*Woo and O’Keeffe 2018*). As Huawei is seeking to and has indeed succeeded in reducing its reliance on U.S. companies, its technological and market capabilities may enable its resilience against the U.S. unilateral export restriction. American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai (AmCham Shanghai) conducted a survey on the impact of U.S. export controls in 2019, and it found a significant loss of revenue of U.S. companies. Most companies

previously supplying products to Huawei were forced to cease all operations with Huawei following its inclusion to the EL. One multinational manufacturing firm confirmed a significant loss in revenue as Huawei simply turned to other international suppliers. Others revealed that they have continued limited business dealings with Huawei through the supply of non-U.S. origin items, though still suffering from losing revenue (*Rechtschaffen and Niu 2019*). In June 2019, FedEx sued the Commerce Department over the export restriction on Huawei. FedEx corporation, one of the U.S.' biggest courier delivery services, claims that the restriction is essentially forcing it to police the millions of packages it ships daily to ensure prohibited items are not being exported to Huawei, a practice which is "legally and logistically impossible." A spokesman for the Commerce Department said it had not yet reviewed the complaint. As Huawei also does business with Silicon Valley for smartphone chips, including with Qualcomm Inc. and Broadcom Inc., Broadcom Inc. has warned of a hit to their own sales from the trade restrictions (*McGee 2019*).

Besides the loss of revenue, another negative impact of the export

control regime is on innovation and competitiveness. While trade liberalism boosts the speed of knowledge transfer and innovation, decreasing technological heterogeneity, the U.S. export control regime impacts innovation by limiting U.S. firms' access to diverse knowledge inputs, thus affecting innovative capacity. It also restricts collaboration between U.S. and foreign researchers, thereby making it less likely that valuable discoveries and inventions will occur in the U.S. (*Seyoum 2017*), which reduces U.S. commercial competitiveness in the telecom market. Instead of boosting U.S. economic and political interests, the regime may have a reverse effect by accelerating China's development through nationalism and strengthening local industries, as it is a hugely successful consumer brand in China and supported by the central government. According to a Financial Time report, Huawei's struggles are "leading to a surge in the brand's popularity among Chinese consumers and a sharp rise in the sales of its smartphones," citing a 33 percent rise in consumers expressing an intent to buy a Huawei phone (*Byford 2019*). further, by barring U.S. industry from participating in the market, foreign vendors may fill the void, further

injuring U.S. competitiveness in the telecom market. In essence, despite the cost of China's alleged IP theft, U.S. companies and the U.S. economy in general will suffer more from losing both revenue and access to knowledge and innovation by limiting exports to Huawei.

Recent Development on Export Control Regime

The export control on Huawei comes amid a larger trade war between the U.S. and China, which was initiated by the Trump administration by putting \$250 billion worth of tariffs on Chinese imports, in response to China's alleged IP theft (*U.S. Relations with China*). Although the trade war is intensified with the export restriction on Huawei, there has been a struggle between Congress and the President over whether to reconcile its relationship with China. On May 22, 2019, a week after adding Huawei to the EL, BIS issued a temporary general license that allowed certain limited categories of exports, reexports, and in-country transfers to the designated Huawei parties to continue for a period of 90 days, effective until Aug. 19, 2019. The license was revised on Aug. 21, effective until Nov. 18, 2019. On Nov. 18,, the license was extended again to February 16, 2020. On February

18, 2020, it was extended the fourth time to April 1, 2020 (*Huawei Temporary General License Extension*).

In the trade talk with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Trump has also agreed to a cease-fire by putting off additional tariffs on Chinese goods indefinitely. He also said he was leaving the Huawei issue until the end of negotiations; now that Huawei looks to "gain a significant reprieve," American firms could ship goods to Huawei (*Davis 2019*). And according to Chinese Ministry of Commerce on Nov. 7, China and the U.S. have also agreed to remove additional tariffs and sign an interim deal to end the costly trade war. Although Trump is making Huawei a part of the trade settlement, his top advisers, including Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, have said the administration was keeping Huawei separate from trade talks. Congress is also trying to limit Trump's ability to ease the restriction Huawei. It was started by a bipartisan group of Senators, including Senators Rubio (R-Florida) and Cotton (R-Arkansas), who introduced the Defending America's 5G Future Act in July 2019, which would codify President Trump's Executive Order and would prohibit the removal of Huawei from the Entity List without an act of Congress. It would also empower

Congress to disallow waivers that any administration might grant to U.S. companies engaged in commerce with Huawei. House representatives have introduced equivalent legislation, although neither has had any updates since July 2019 (*Tabler 2019*). Senator Marco Rubio also filed legislation that aimed to prevent Huawei from seeking damages in U.S. patent court, after Huawei demanded that U.S. telecom operator Verizon Communications pay \$1 billion to license the rights to patented technology. Under the amendment, companies on certain U.S. government watch lists, which would include Huawei, would not be allowed to seek relief under U.S. law with respect to U.S. patents, including bringing legal action over patent infringement (*Li 2019*). On Feb. 27, 2020, the Senate unanimously voted to pay rural telecom carriers \$1 billion to rip and replace any gear in their networks from Chinese telecommunications giants Huawei and ZTE. The legislation is now pending for the President's signature. Top administration figures have indicated general support for the funding, which would mark yet another victory in the president's efforts to exclude Huawei from telecom networks in the U.S. (*Hendel*

2020). Evidently, lawmakers see the export control vital to protecting 5G networks. The AmCham Shanghai interview with many U.S. companies found many agree that U.S. actions against Huawei have become overly politicized (*Rechtschaffen and Niu 2019*). Huawei has also warned against the politicization of innovation and IPR (*Li 2019*). Huawei is likely to be used as a bargaining chip in the larger Sino-US trade war, as well as in the context of protectionist and nationalistic policy under the Trump administration.

Conclusion

During the 90s, U.S.-China trade was largely liberal and bilateral due to demand from industries and businesses that were seeking opportunities in the Chinese markets. The access to Chinese markets has led to an increase of total value of export and a greater profit for companies dealing with China, and yet at the same time, the U.S. was also exposed to China's IPR violation and threat to national security. Although China remains one of the most important trading partners with the U.S., the Trump administration seeks to impose a rigorous export control targeting Huawei, one of the biggest global telecom infrastructure brands.

Under the instruction of President Trump, the BIS forbade export of telecom technology to Huawei earlier in May 2019, only to grant a temporary general license so that U.S. companies could keep its business with Huawei until November 2019. Citing a “national emergency” and “undue risk,” the Trump administration imposes the export control regime to protect the U.S. from IPR violation that not only leads to economic loss but also threatens national security. Apart from preventing economic loss and enhancing security, the Trump administration is also seeking to slow down China’s development of telecom technology in order to maintain its supremacy in the telecom market, especially in the race to 5G technology. Huawei is a leading company in the development of 5G network, and the U.S. needs to support 5G deployment while also giving domestic companies an advantage in the global economy by considering trade policies that impose restrictions on foreign technology providers. The rationale behind the U.S. export control regime is thus multidimensional and contextual: in the case of Huawei, the U.S. is specifically considering protecting its domestic deployment of 5G network by

undermining its foreign competitors. Behind the export control is power politics; technological development is thus politicized in the struggle over supremacy in the telecom market. The need to preserve U.S. supremacy in telecom technology and protect the U.S. from IP theft lead to a group of policy entrepreneurs who actively push forward hardline approach in trade with China. Policy entrepreneurs were active in pushing forward trade policies with China. President Trump promised to end China’s IP theft and protect domestic industries by issuing executive orders and memoranda to investigate China’s trade practice. Considering the collateral cost from tariffs on the economy, Trump is seeking to ease the tension with China. Policy entrepreneurs in the Congress, on the other hand, have bipartisan support to maintain the strict export restriction. The struggle between the Presidency and a united Congress over whether to lift the restriction on Huawei suggests that export control is a political tool and reflective of the zero-sum mentality of the Trump administration. Members of Congress are homogeneous in pursuing a stricter export control against Huawei, despite the President’s bid for

reconciliation. President Trump has promised to turn American trade policy more favorable to domestic producers, and the administration restricts the export to Huawei in order to guard against China's alleged IP theft and threat to U.S. supremacy in the 5G network race, yet contrary to those ends, the export control on Huawei alone will put U.S. companies at a significant competitive disadvantage in the global market. Given the massive international supply chain, the unilateral export control policy from the U.S. side may prove ineffective in the long run. With a promising agreement reached in November to end the trade war, the concession from the U.S. as the initiator of the trade war may suggest its realization that it is difficult to maintain the supreme status in technological development without collateral damage, especially due to the multiple players in the global market.

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Rijeka, Croatia
Jaclyn Flood, Class of 2021



Prague, Czech Republic
Caroline O'Connor, Class of 2020

Global Review of the Environmental Impacts & Warming Potential from International Food Waste

Lily Roberts, 2022

The following sections are an ecological, political, and economic review of global food waste and its environmental consequences. These impacts are analyzed by identifying the food waste problem; discussing quantification of food waste; examining the biggest producers of food waste on an international scale; and identifying the subsequent land and water use implications. Current regulatory responses and potential policy solutions are offered to respond to the consequences of global food waste. This article will argue that the largely unaddressed problem of food waste poses a significant threat to the environmental integrity and stability of the planet.

The Food Waste Problem

Food waste is a relatively new concept that has been explored over the past sixty years. Food waste is defined as food that is lost or wasted, uneaten or unused. About one-third of the food produced for human consumption is categorized as food waste (FAO 2013). The

majority of this food ends up in landfills, making up approximately 21% of landfill volume, as a global average. Furthermore, urban food waste (UFW) was predicted to increase by 44% from 2005 to 2025 as the middle class emerges in less developed countries (Adhikari, Barrington & Martinez 2006). This increase has significant environmental implications, both in terms of resource use (land & water) and greenhouse gas emissions. Significant proportions of atmospheric methane and carbon dioxide concentrations can be linked to food waste and emissions from landfills; 19-29% of anthropogenically-emitted greenhouse gasses are a product of food systems driven by human patterns of consumption (Vermuelen et al. 2012). Since food waste is an emerging and evolving concept in scientific discourse, regulatory and policy responses have been limited.

Quantifying Food Waste and Examining the Supply Chain

The amount of global food waste is estimated to be about 1.6 gigatons of food per year (both edible and non-edible). This can be compared to the 6 gigatons of agricultural production yearly, both for food and non-food uses (FAO 2013).

The supply chain is the various steps that food goes through from production to consumption to disposal. Food is lost at many different places in the supply chain. When comparing food waste between developed and developing countries, loss occurs at different parts of the supply chain (Table 1). In developed countries, a larger portion of food waste is lost on the consumption side of the supply chain, as compared to less developed countries where food is lost on the production and retailing steps of the supply chain.

Table 1: Food Loss Throughout the Supply Chain by Country (Source: FAO 2013)

Loss at Production and Retailing	Loss at Consumption
Europe	North America/ Oceania
North America/ Oceania	Europe
Industrialized Asia	Industrialized Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa	North Africa, West and Central Asia
North Africa, West and Central Asia	Latin America
South and Southeast Asia	South and Southeast Asia
Latin America	Sub-Saharan Africa

A per-capita estimate of food waste found that approximately 95-115 kg of food per year is wasted by consumers in North America and Europe, as compared to 6-11 kg/year in sub-Saharan Africa and South/Southeast Asia (FAO 2011). The upstream losses of food in more affluent, developed countries are most likely a result of over-consumption and unclear and poorly communicated food distribution, such as the unstandardized and misinterpreted “best by” and “sell by” dates on retailed packaging. Within the supply chain, a restricting aesthetic standard creates loss in more developed countries. Fruit and vegetables that are perfectly edible go unharvested or unsold because of minor aesthetic issues, such as bumps, bruises, and discoloration. In less economically developed nations, a lack of infrastructure creates loss in the post-harvest stages of the supply chain, due mostly to a lack of technological development in the storage, handling and transportation of food products (FAO 2013).

Water and Land Waste

Recent estimates of the human water footprint approximate that about 92% of human water use is from consumption of agricultural

products (FAO 2013). Due to both the large amount of food produced, and how much water goes into that production, approximately 25% of global freshwater usage is wasted on food that goes uneaten or is categorized as “lost.”

Roughly 40% of the world’s land that is deemed arable is currently used in crop production. However, about 28% of that land is used to produce food that is known as food waste (FAO 2003; FAO 2013). As such, food waste represents staggering amounts of resources used on a global scale, per year.


The Carbon Footprint of Food Waste

Measurements of the carbon footprint of food waste includes the carbon emitted from all steps of the supply chain, from the agricultural phase to the transportation to landfills at the end of the supply chain. However, land use change (LUC), or the transformation of forests into arable land used for farming and production, is not accounted for in this estimation of the carbon footprint of food waste. If land use changes were included in these calculations, the carbon levels would be between 25-40% higher due to the association decrease in carbon sequestration from

deforestation and increased agricultural production (Hörtenhuber et al. 2012; Tubiello et al. 2013).

Excluding LUC, the global carbon footprint of food waste is estimated to be 3.3 gigatons of carbon dioxide. On a per capita basis, the average carbon footprint of food waste is approximately 500 kg of carbon dioxide eq. per year. Europe, North America and Oceania have the highest per capita carbon footprint from food waste, at approximately 700-900 kg of carbon dioxide eq. per year. South/Southeast Asia has the lowest carbon footprint from food waste, with only 180 kg of carbon dioxide eq. per capita, per year (FAO 2013). If food waste were to be ranked among the largest emitters of greenhouse gasses on a per country basis, it would be the third largest emitter of greenhouse gasses per year (Graph 1).

Graph 1: Greenhouse Gas Emissions per Country, With Food Waste Integrated (Verso 2015)



Methane Emissions From Decomposition

Decomposition is the process by which microorganisms break down organic material into smaller parts. For most organic materials, their decomposition process occurs in the presence of oxygen. The organic materials undergo the process of decomposition, where bacteria and other single-celled microorganisms, break down the materials by performing aerobic respiration. The decomposers break down the glucose in the material, as modeled by the following equation.




The decomposers break down the glucose in the organic materials, and using oxygen, produce adenosine triphosphate (ATP), which is a molecule that allows the decomposers to do work at the cellular level. Decomposition is essential to maintaining the integrity of an ecosystem; the process is mutually beneficial, as the bacteria return nutrients back to the ecosystem, while performing respiration and generating ATP for their own energy needs.

However, in landfills, the decomposers do not have access to oxygen to perform aerobic respiration. Instead, the

decomposers—archaea—decompose organic material through an anaerobic process known as methanogenesis. In methanogenesis, polymeric materials, such as glucose, are converted into methane and carbon dioxide, without oxygen present. There are four steps of the methanogenetic process, as outlined in Graph 2 below. The process begins with a complex biopolymer that undergoes hydrolysis, acidogenesis, acetogenesis, and then methanogenesis, where hydrogen, carbon dioxide and acetate yield methane and carbon dioxide.


Graph 2: Anaerobic Digestion by Methanogenesis (Source: Penn State University College of Earth and Mineral Sciences)




Today, a significant portion of anthropogenically-emitted methane can be traced to emissions from landfills (Adhikari, Barrington &

Martinez 2006). In 2017, the United States Environmental Protection Agency estimated that methane makes up about 10% of total GHG emissions in the United States; of that 10%, landfills are responsible for 16% of total methane emissions, as demonstrated by the two graphs below.

Graph 3: U.S. GHG Emissions in 2017 (Source: EPA)



Graph 4: U.S. Methane Emissions by Source (Source: EPA)



Additionally, a fraction of methane emissions from food waste can be attributed to manure management and feed digestion in ruminants (Graph 4). The demand for meat from these livestock is increasing in the developing world as economic mobility increases, providing the potential for more food waste and higher ruminant-sourced methane emissions in the near future.

Warming Potential of GHG Emissions From Food Waste

The large amount of methane and carbon dioxide that food waste is responsible for has significant implications for global warming and climate change. Since the eighteenth century, the average global temperature has increased by about 0.8°C, and is expected to increase by at least 1°C and possibly by as much as 5°C (IPCC 2017; Dickinson & Cicerone 1986). Through a natural process known as the greenhouse effect, the greenhouse gasses (carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, water vapor and methane) trap heat in the Earth’s atmosphere. In its equilibrium state, the greenhouse effect keeps Earth a life-sustaining temperature. However, anthropogenically-emitted greenhouse gasses increase the concentration of greenhouses gasses in the atmosphere and as such, the

rate and intensity of heat being trapped increases as well.

Different greenhouse gasses influence the warming of Earth in different capacities. Though methane exists in concentrations that are two to six orders of magnitude less than that of the concentrations of atmospheric carbon dioxide, methane traps more infrared light than carbon dioxide per molecule. Hence, methane is far more dangerous than carbon dioxide when it comes to global warming. Methane has, per mole, a global warming potential 3.7 times that of carbon dioxide (Lashof and Ahuja 1990).

Carbon dioxide constitutes roughly 80% of yearly greenhouse gas emissions on a global scale (EPA 2017). As such, and similarly to methane, carbon dioxide has notable warming potential. Since food waste is predicted to increase over the next 30 years, the carbon burden of the food supply chain will only increase, adding to the already unprecedented levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide. There are many potential environmental impacts from this increase in average global temperature. Global warming has been correlated to increased frequency and severity of wildfires, hurricanes, and coastal flooding (Running 2006; Mousavi et

al. 2010; Nicholls and Cazenave 2010). Global warming and climate change will affect Earth's ability to efficiently function and its ability to sustain life, human and otherwise.

Impact on Ecosystem Services

Food waste has a direct relationship with an increase in greenhouse gasses and an increase in average global temperature. Global warming and climate change will affect Earth's ecosystem services in the following ways:

Regulating: There are many natural regulatory processes that the Earth has in order to maintain equilibrium. Soil erosion and flood prevention are regulated naturally by ecological barriers and cycles. However, the increased frequency and severity of natural disasters that is expected to come with climate change will alter the ability of the Earth to self-regulate, as natural disasters will increase erosion and flooding (Anderson 2006). Additionally, natural climate regulation is altered with human emissions of greenhouse gasses that expedite the process of global warming.

Provisioning: Global warming and climate change impact biodiversity.

Resources that are invaluable to humans, such as wood, will change in availability, both in terms of quantity and consistency. Additionally, historically successful crops may no longer bring the same harvest that they traditionally have. Key crops, such as rice, maize, wheat, millet and sorghum, that are integral for human food security, may not grow optimally with changing climate conditions.

Supporting: A relationship between increased droughts and water scarcity, and an increasing population and climate change has been established (Alexander et al. 1995; Schewe et al. 2014). Droughts and water scarcity impact the efficiency of primary productivity, which influences the rest of the food web. The effects on supporting ecosystem services, such as nutrient cycling and provisioning of habitats, affects the ability of all other ecosystem services to function.

Cultural: The environment, as much as it services a quantitative service to humans, offers qualitative resources that benefit the human population, as well. The offering of these services changes as temperature increases; participating in activities such skiing, ice climbing and ice skating become less available with

climate change. Additionally, nature becomes more hazardous, with an increase in weather events such as heat waves and natural disasters that pose an existential threat to humanity's existence.

Stakeholders

Human population: Food waste poses a large threat to the ability of the planet to sustain life in the long term. The human population should thus have a vested interest in restricting the processes and tendencies that are harmful to the Earth. Many international negotiations, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Climate Agreement, demonstrate concern over the planet's increasing temperature. However, these negotiations are non-binding, and global greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase.

Government: In theory, the purpose of the government is to keep the interests of the people at the forefront and maintain decision making that prioritizes their well-being. In terms of food waste, and subsequent global warming and climate change, different governments have varying interests. Some progressive governments, such as Germany and Denmark, see

the threat that climate change poses and have made pledges to reduce their contributions to this environmental problem. Other governments, such as the Russian government, see an economic advantage in climate change; as ice melts around the caps, new, more efficient shipping routes are opened up around Russia, optimizing trade and travel.

Farmers (agricultural industry): Farmers and those generally involved in agricultural production industry seek economic profit and growth. Reducing food waste, on the outside, seems like it would cause a reduction in job opportunities in the agricultural industry. However, the problem lies in how much food we throw away, not in how much food we produce. By adopting sustainable measures in the food industry, food production would remain the same, while food storage, distribution, and purchasing could be optimized. Additionally, jobs would be created as a new sector of sustainability in the food industry would expand to better allocate food resources worldwide.

Social and Economic Implications

Economic implications: In the United States alone, food waste costs about

\$218 billion annually, and represents 1.3% of the annual gross domestic product (GDP). This loss represents an economic urgency for interest in reducing food waste and cutting financial losses.

Optimization of food distribution: There are roughly 795 million food insecure people in the world. About 58% of people in low-income countries are food insecure, while only about 11% in high-income countries are food insecure. Today, enough food is being produced to sustain the entire Earth's population, yet a third of the produced for human consumption is wasted. If food distribution were optimized, global food insecurity could be completely eliminated.

Water optimization: 1.1 billion people lack access to water and 2.7 billion people experience water scarcity on a frequent basis. However, a large portion of the water used towards agriculture is being wasted on food that goes uneaten. In the same way that food distribution could be optimized, current water use is inefficient and prioritizes agricultural commodities and economic growth over consistent access to water for all people.

Solutions to the Food Waste Problem

Cultural: Much of the work to be done regarding the global food waste problem is in the cultural realm of food consumption. In higher income countries, restrictions on aesthetics limit what food makes it through the majority of the supply chain. Embracing foods that do not meet the traditional aesthetic standards in terms of shape, color and size will increase the proportion of food that makes it from farm to table. Other measures, such as standardizing food labels in developed countries to clarify how long food lasts and when it is safe for consumption, will further reduce edible food waste.

Regulatory: Many new regulations are being passed in progressive countries worldwide. Recently, the following waste reduction goals have been set:

- Australia set a goal to reduce their food waste volume by 50% by 2030; food waste currently costs Australia's economy \$20 million USD per year.
- Norway set a goal to halve food waste by 2030.
- France has mandated recycling for businesses and prohibited

large-scale grocery stores from throwing away edible food.

- Italy has passed laws incentivizing supermarkets to donate their unsold, quality food.
- Denmark has launched projects and subsidies to tackle food waste (Lemos 2019).

Outlook

There is still much research to be done regarding food waste and its environmental impacts. Future research on the issue of food waste should aim to include the environmental impacts of land use changes in estimates of food waste carbon footprints; the warming potential per country from their greenhouse gas emissions from food waste; and modeling how and to what extent greenhouse gasses emissions from food waste are projected to grow as the agricultural industry strives to meet the food needs of a world population that will soon be 9 billion people. The incentive of reducing the catastrophic potential of climate change by addressing the food waste problem directly is one that falls on governments but is largely ignored in favor of production and economic growth. However, solving the food waste issue could be a strategic plan to combat global

environmental problems and address climate change before the effects are irreversible.

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Lisbon, Portugal
Kristen Morris, Class of 2020



Mytilene, Lesvos, Greece
Sara Weeks, Class of 2020

The Dialectic of a Revolution

Phyu Khine, 2020

Introduction

The *Gwangju* Uprising that occurred in South Korea in 1980 remains the most famous and most controversial democratic movement in the country. It is the bloodiest instance of government repression in modern South Korean history. While the protests were initially unsuccessful in bringing about democratic reforms in the country, the *Gwangju* Uprising laid an important foundation for the country's transformation into a liberal democracy today. The *Gwangju* Uprising, like all revolutions around the world, happened due to contradictions between existing ideas then, a discourse-based concept known as the dialectical method. This dialectical method of understanding the conflict-ridden world is often used to explain the occurrence of revolutions around the world. This paper seeks to illuminate the *Gwangju* Uprising as the violent clash between the dominant ideas of the society, also known as the thesis – which in this case are the single-minded focus on economic

growth after the Korean War and the rise of oppressive authoritarian rule in the country – and the rising contradicting viewpoints, i.e. the antithesis – dissatisfaction from unequal growth within the country, increasing call for democratization among civilians, and imposition of martial law in the country. Ultimately, the violent clash between the thesis and the antithesis resulted in an emergence of new perspectives, known as the synthesis, in the aftermath of the *Gwangju* Uprising such as the gradual democratization of the country, development of the *Minjung* ideology, and a well-respected culture of protests.

Dialectic as a Conflict Model of Society

The dialectic originated from Hegel, a German philosopher, as a way to “explain the source of social upheaval that attends human development and reveals the future of civilization” (Chilcote, 1994, p79). He saw conflict and the violence that accompanies it, as necessary evils to

the progress of human civilization. The dialectic is essentially a conflict model of society due to the existence of contradicting ideas in society that cannot coexist at the same time. As the thesis and the antithesis inevitably clash, war, rebellions, and revolutions are made. Hegel also claimed that the dialectic is an eternal movement towards perfection where the synthesis becomes the new thesis and set the dialectic in motion again. In his analysis of the Hegelian dialectic and its social implications, Paul Gottfried argued that “the dialectic does not move irreversibly from thesis to antithesis to synthesis, ..., [instead] the relationship of all three terms are subject to mediation, [and] the terms themselves only exist with reference to each other” (Gottfried, 1980, p428). Ultimately, the dialectic explains the endless conflict throughout history and predicts more violence in the future.

While Hegel’s idea of dialectic is mainly philosophical, Marx saw it as a material process. He focused on the abilities of economic conditions to shape history. Within Historical Materialism that Marx expressed, alienation is a significant aspect in precipitating revolutions. While Marx’s main argument was the irrevocability of a communist

revolution due to the changes in the mode of production that resulted in the alienation of the workers, his argument can be expanded to explain other types of revolutions, even if they did not result in communism. All revolutions are in search of the truth – whatever that may be – in a world full of contradictions (Muscio, 1914). The push for democratization in South Korea, that culminated in the *Gwangju* Uprising in 1980, is a result of people feeling alienated by the status quo policies that were dominant in Korean society then.

Thesis

As the Korean War left South Korea in widespread abject poverty, economic prosperity became the highest priority in the government’s effort to rebuild the country. The 1960s and 1970s in South Korea were characterized by rapid economic growth, coupled with a lack of political and personal freedom. Much of this could be attributed to the republic’s second president, Park Chung-Hee, who gained control of the country via a military coup in 1961. A highly decisive leader, Park promptly implemented economic policies that encouraged mechanization, created heavy industries and pushed for an export-led economy. Coupled

with heavy state intervention in the economy, Park practically transformed the South Korean economy almost single-handedly. In a study that analyzed the legacy of the Park regime, it claimed that “when the First Five Year Economic Plan was launched in 1962, South Korea's exports were a mere \$55 million; by 1978 they had reached \$12.4 billion, [and] per capita GNP rose rapidly from \$87 to \$1,242 [during the same period]” (Kamiya, 1980, p744). With impressive results to boost, Park enjoyed widespread popularity during his reign, despite being a brutal dictator. Even his strongest critics could not argue against Park’s impressive economic achievements in the country. The single-minded focus on economic growth was *the* prevailing rhetoric then, surpassing all other concerns. After all, disagreeing with it would mean one wished to go back to the starving days.

Using the need for economic development as an excuse, authoritarian leadership became a norm in post-Korean War South Korea. The Park regime argued that democracy was ineffective in bringing about positive economic changes in the country. With economic results being in his favor, it was difficult for the people to argue against his consolidation of

power. Whatever he was doing, it was efficient in bringing about better standards of living for his people. In 1972, he unveiled a new constitution for the country, known as the *Yushin* Constitution, in which he granted absolute power to himself. Not only was the term limit for the presidency removed, but the eligibility requirements to run for presidency also became so stringent that he was practically the only one qualified for it. Essentially, the *Yushin* constitution made Park’s dictatorship legal. In his journal, *Patterns of Military Rule and Prospects for Democracy in South Korea*, author Yung Myung Kim argued that “Park justified the authoritarianism by emphasizing administrative efficiency which he deemed indispensable for reunification and economic growth” (Kim, 2004, p123). He ruled South Korea under an iron fist for 18 years until his assassination in 1979. With the new constitution, he was able to openly violate political and civil rights as his opponents were often detained under false charges. Using the threats of communism and North Korea as pretexts, the military was mobilized to control the people, ‘indecent’ books were forbidden, and political opposition was banned. While South Korea was never a true democracy since its founding in 1945, Park normalized authoritarian

rule in the country. He became so powerful that challenges to his rule were ultimately quelled without much resistance.

Antithesis

While the Park regime's economic policies led to the overall rise in standards of living, there was visible unequal growth in the country. Regional cleavages existed in the Korean peninsula historically but a particular brand of regionalism, based on economic differences, emerged during the Park regime. Park is from the *Gyeongsanbuk-do* Province located in Eastern South Korea. When formulating economic policies, Park was known to have favored his hometown over other provinces. The city of *Daegu*, having received more investments than anywhere else in the country, became the industrial center of South Korea in the 1960s. The Park regime also suffered from nepotistic reputation as many employed in the government hailed from his hometown. On the other hand, other provinces, particularly the *Jeolla* Province, where the city of *Gwangju* is located, in Southwestern South Korea, did not see much growth. Matters were made more complicated by the fact that the most prominent opponent of Park, Kim Dae-Jung, was from the Jeolla

Province. The people of Jeolla Province were convinced that Park discriminated against them because of Kim, planting seeds of dissatisfaction. Ha Yong-Chool claimed, in his article *Impact of Democratization on Regionalism in Korea: A Complex Interplay*, Park's favoring of his hometown over other provinces resulted in "uneven regional development and unequal distribution of income and socioeconomic infrastructure" (Ha, 2006, p109). Domestic and international media were praising Park for his economic achievements and yet, the Jeolla Province saw very little of that growth in their region. This general dissatisfaction with the government among the people of Jeolla Province ultimately paved the way for a violent clash between the two parties.

During the 1970s and 1980s, South Korean university students, most of them born after the Korean War, spearheaded democratization movements in the country. This generation of young people grew up in a relatively industrialized and richer South Korea, compared to their parents' generation who grew up in the aftermath of the Korean War. While their parents worried about basic necessities and survival, this generation concerned themselves with achieving

widespread political participation. The Park regime's tendency to use economic development to justify his authoritarian rule was losing legitimacy among the younger generations. Moreover, the military and police often raided universities unannounced, aiming to intimidate the intellectuals from speaking up against Park. Unable to think or speak freely in their country, dissent was brewing among students. Formidable challenges to oppressive rule started to take shape in the late 1970s.

The adoption of policies of denial by the government despite growing discontent among the people was the last straw that broke the camel's back, which in this case, sparked mass protests. The assassination of Park by the head of his intelligence agency in 1979 brought hope to many that democratization would finally happen in South Korea. Chaos ensued as a power vacuum was created, with disagreements on who should take over. Nonetheless, general Chun Doo-Hwan quickly gained power after another military coup, quickly crushing the hopes of democracy in South Korea. As James C. Davies eloquently put it, "[a] revolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short

period of sharp reversal, during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickly widens and becomes intolerable" (Davies, 1969, p547). The death of Park was the closest South Korea had ever come to political change for 18 years and hope soared amongst citizens. Hope was rampant. However, the people's voices for a democratic government was ignored and another military leader was instituted in short succession. As a result, discontent was higher than ever. Moreover, on May 17, 1980, Chun ordered martial law to be put in place countrywide. He dissolved the national assembly, established himself the dictator, ordered the closing of universities, banned all political activities, and curtailed the press. The military was deployed to prevent people from gathering. The irony of such actions is that they made people more determined than ever to fight for their rights. A revolution was imminent.

Violent Clash between Thesis and Antithesis – Culmination in the Gwangju Uprising

On May 18, 1980, students gathered in front of *Chonnam* University in *Gwangju* to protest its closing. The government, in turn, responded by deploying paramilitary troops to contain the protest. The protest

turned violent almost immediately with the police/military resorting to using deadly force. As protesting students died at the hands of the government forces, more civilians joined the protest. While the protest was happening in full force in *Gwangju*, the rest of the country was kept in the dark. Through heavy media censorship, the Chun regime was able to keep the extent of the uprising under wrap and ultimately branded the protesters as North-Korean and communist sympathizers. The city was put under a total blockade with soldiers guarding every entry point. The violent uprising lasted approximately a week. It eventually ended on May 27 after heavy military involvement with tanks and helicopters and fired indiscriminately at the protesting crowd. Official accounts state that around 200 civilians were killed, while *Gwangju* citizens insist that the number was closer to 2000. Although civil dissent has always existed throughout the country's military regime, the *Gwangju* uprising was famous for the scale of violence involved and more importantly, the government's openly ruthless repression of personal freedom. The uprising was so significant that South Korea is still dealing with its legacy on the Korean society today. While the

Gwangju Uprising was unsuccessful in bringing about immediate change, it was akin to a national awakening in the fight for democracy.

Synthesis

The *Gwangju* uprising paved the way for South Korea's gradual transformation to democracy. While the uprising was heavily suppressed and censored, it sparked a highly determined democratization movement. *Gwangju* became the center in the movement, albeit most of the work was done underground. As Hyaeweol Choi expressed, "the *Gwangju* incident gave rise to a strong doubt in the legitimacy of the government, not only by students but also by general citizens" (Choi, 1997, p177). Before the uprising, calls for democratization were concentrated among students. The rest were apathetic to the cause. However, witnessing the death of many of their young students gave the civilians a sense of urgency, because they realized that they or their loved ones could be next. Civil society was born, and democracy was on the way. After another massive protest in 1987 in *Seoul*, the capital city, the military regime finally caved and allowed a direct presidential election. The constitution was also amended with

the National Assembly reinstated, and civil and political rights of the people strengthened. Although the 1987 election resulted in the election of Roh Tae Woo, Chun's right-hand man, as the opposition split votes, it was still the first free and fair election the country oversaw. The people respected the result of the election nonetheless. The June Struggle in 1987 completed the work that started in 1980 in *Gwangju*. Since 1987, South Korea's democratic system features a regular rotation of power through direct presidential election, robust political pluralism and engaged civil society. Nevertheless, the quest for democratic consolidation continues as South Korea faces new challenges to its democracy such as widespread corruption in the top government offices.

One of the most important legacies of the *Gwangju* Uprising was the emergence of the *Minjung* movement. *Minjung*, loosely translated, means the people, specifically the majority of the people who are oppressed within the society. Han Wan-Sang, the leading authority on *Minjung* studies, defines it as "the resistance force who boldly struggle against the unjust political power" (Han, 1981, p64). As people become conscious of their alienation from

the political process, they take actions against the unjust system. These people are focused on toppling the exploitative system put in place by the authoritarian governments. *Minjung* movements sought to change history by making political representation more just. Understanding that the system is inherently unequal, they sought to resist the proliferation of the system by emphasizing their identity and maintaining their self-consciousness. In retrospect, the *Gwangju* Uprising was defined as a *Minjung* movement, as well as subsequent events in the democratization process. While the *Minjung* movement is sometimes associated with class struggles, Han warned that it was political power that dominated all aspects of life in Korean society during authoritarian rule (Wells, 1995). As the country slowly democratized, *Minjung* movements faced a steady decay as their founding was rooted in political oppression. Social movements in South Korea have shifted away from a distinctly political focus to more diverse issues such as environmental and women's rights. Nevertheless, the *Minjung* ideology united people during a time of political crisis.

The right to peaceful assembly has become a cornerstone in South

Korean politics after the ill-treatment of protesters during the *Gwangju* uprising. Every Saturday, it is almost impossible to walk through *Gwanghwamun* Square in downtown Seoul without passing a protest. The issues being protested constitute a wide range from unfair labor practice to the presence of US forces in South Korea. The ubiquity of peaceful demonstrations traces back to the country's authoritarian past, where the people's voices were brutally suppressed. Today, the protests represent the engaging civil society that South Korea has cultivated. They signify the determination of the Korean people to participate in their political system. The government has also learned from its past. While police are often deployed to protest areas, they are mainly there to maintain order and ensure that free speech is protected. Such measured approach by the police is a stark departure from the authoritarian times. In 2016, as many as 1.7 million people marched to call for the impeachment of then-president Park Geun Hye, who was accused of corruption. The largely peaceful protests, also known as candlelight protests, went on for months until the impeachment of Park in March 2017. As Brookings institute argued, "the candlelight protests were another reminder of the centrality

of civil society and protest in resisting authoritarianism and putting the spotlight on the persistent injustices in South Korea, despite past violent reprisals, torture, and imprisonment" (Pak and Park, 2019, p3). A culture of protests that stems from past government atrocities is central to understanding the interaction between the Korean public and government today.

Conclusion

Contradictions exist in all societies. Revolutions are inevitable. Nonetheless, as the *Gwangju* Uprising demonstrates, revolutions can have a progressive effect on society. As the dominant classes, in this case, the elite political class, would not stand to lose status quo policies that benefit them, violence between the thesis and antithesis is unavoidable. Oppressive authoritarian rule alienated most civilians from the political process, resulting in a revolution. Ultimately, it led to steady democratic consolidation in South Korea, united a people under suffering and cultivated a culture of protest. However, democratic consolidation is a never-ending process. New contradiction arises within the South Korean democracy today as different aspects of society clash. An

advantage to using the dialectic to explain the occurrence of conflicts in the world is that it is bounded neither by space nor time. As Hegel would say, dialectic – the desire to improve – does not have an end. Just like the legacy that *Gwangju* Uprising left in Korean society, other revolutions will come to shed light on new perspectives.

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Rabat Medina, Morocco
Kristen Morris, Class of 2020